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Monetizing Infringement
Kristelia García*
The deterrence of copyright infringement and the evils of piracy have long
been an axiomatic focus of both legislators and scholars. The conventional
view is that infringement must be curbed and/or punished in order for
copyright to fulfill its purported goals of incentivizing creation and ensuring
access to works. This Essay proves this view false by demonstrating that
some rightsholders don’t merely tolerate, but actually encourage
infringement, both explicitly and implicitly, in a variety of different
situations and for one common reason: they benefit from it. Rightsholders’
ability to monetize infringement destabilizes long-held but problematic
assumptions about both rightsholder preferences, and about copyright’s
optimal infringement policy.
Through a series of case studies, this Essay describes the impetuses and
normative implications of this counterintuitive — but not so unusual —
phenomenon. Recognition of monetized infringement in copyright is
interesting not only for its unexpectedness, but also for the broader point
that its existence suggests: we have an impoverished descriptive account of
why some laws operate the way that they do. This is particularly unsettling
in an area like copyright, where advocates are sharply divided along policy
lines. This Essay is an important first step toward a positive theory of
copyright — one that recognizes the underappreciated role, both positive
and negative, that private parties play in policymaking.

* Copyright © 2020 Kristelia García. Associate Professor at the University of
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INTRODUCTION
When Stephanie Lenz filmed her toddler dancing in the kitchen with
Prince’s hit song “Let’s Go Crazy” playing in the background and posted
it to YouTube,1 copyright owner Universal Music issued a takedown
notice alleging infringement.2 In response, Lenz claimed fair use, and
the parties ended up in court for eight years.3 When a fan posted a
homemade video of a young boy dancing to an Aphex Twin song to
YouTube, copyright owner Warp Records declined to issue a takedown
notice, and instead tweeted the video out from its own Twitter account:

As of this writing, the video has over 250,000 views.4
Both of these instances involve a user uploading a video that uses a
copyrighted work without prior permission. In the former case,
rightsholder Universal Music took the (ultimately unsuccessful)
position that the upload amounted to infringement, and sought to
enforce their copyright under the statute.5 In the latter case,
rightsholder Warp Records not only declined to enforce its copyright
1 Stephanie
Lenz, “Let’s Go Crazy” #1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1KfJHFWlhQ [https://perma.cc/G73N-KBEY].
2 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016).
3 See Copyright Law — Digital Millennium Copyright Act — Ninth Circuit Requires
Analysis of Fair Use Before Issuing of Takedown Notices. — Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp., No. 13-16106, 2016 WL 1056082 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2016), reh’g en banc denied,
id., 129 HARV. L. REV. 2289, 2289-93 (2016) [hereinafter Recent Case, Lenz v. Universal
Music Corp.], for a concise and comprehensive summary of the litigation.
4 See Ryan Wyer, Aphex Twin – Minipops 67 [120.2][Source Field Mix], YOUTUBE
(Nov. 22, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wm1XwkOHxx8&list=PLK3ot
LXbk_p1EJD0pse0mcqrRNrOeeZ3P&index=3&t=0s [https://perma.cc/94GQ-WUDN].
5 See Recent Case, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., supra note 3, at 2290-91.
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against the YouTube user, but also actively publicized the video, thereby
significantly increasing its views (and with it, both the song and the
user’s popularity).
Warp’s response is unexpected not least of all because the
conventional view is that infringement — often including fair uses, until
shown definitively to be the case — must be curbed and/or punished
(often severely) in order for copyright to fulfill its purported goals of
incentivizing creation and ensuring access to creative works. This view
is so firmly and widely held that all three branches of intellectual
property — copyright, patent, and trademark — operate under a strict
liability standard for infringement.6 In other words, if infringement is
found, the infringer is liable regardless of whether they intended to
infringe, or even whether they were aware they had. In addition,
copyright allows rightsholders whose work is infringed to opt for

6 In copyright, see, for example, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure
of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1682 (2012),
concluding that in the case of copyright infringement it “makes little difference for
liability whether the copying was intentional, negligent, or a genuine mistake;” Dane S.
Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 RUTGERS L. REV.
351, 356 (2002), noting that infringement in copyright does not require “scienter, intent,
knowledge, negligence, or similar culpable mental state. On the contrary, liability for
civil copyright infringement is strict.” But cf. Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement
a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305 (2015) (questioning the conventional
view and suggesting that infringement liability acts more like a fault-based tort).
In trademark, see, for example, Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark
Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2109 (2004), calling trademark infringement a strict
liability tort; Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1310 (2011), finding that courts have
long interpreted trademark as a strict liability offense. But cf. Alfred C. Yen, Intent and
Trademark Infringement, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 713 (2015) (arguing that the conventional
view of intent in trademark is flawed).
In patent, see, for example, Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800-01 (2002), “Patent
infringement is a strict liability tort in the sense that a defendant may be liable without
having had any notice, prior to the filing of an infringement action, that her conduct
was infringing. In other words, innocent (i.e., unintentional or inadvertent)
infringement is not a defense to a patent infringement claim, and a court usually will
enjoin the defendant from infringing even though she was put on notice only by the
filing of the lawsuit.” (citations omitted); Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for
Absolute Infringement in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (2016), “It is irrelevant
under current law whether the defendant actually copied the patentee’s technology, let
alone whether it intentionally, recklessly, negligently or inadvertently copied the
patentee’s technology. Put simply, patent infringement is an absolute liability regime.”
But cf. Patrick R. Goold, Patent Accidents: Questioning Strict Liability in Patent Law, 95
IND. L.J. 1075 (2020) (questioning the propriety of a strict liability standard in the
context of accidental patent infringement).
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recovery of statutory damages, regardless of actual harm.7 In sum,
copyright infringement has long been painted as the enemy of cultural
production and human flourishing, and its deterrence has long been a
primary focus of both popular and scholarly inquiry.8
Some copyright infringement is committed innocently — there are
only so many musical notes, for example, and it is not uncommon for
similar chords to be used in songs of the same genre.9 Other instances
of infringement might be described as malicious, or at least as recklessly
indifferent. For example, self-styled “appropriation artist” Richard
Prince was sued for copying photographs from several people’s
Instagram feeds, adding a nonsense comment, then selling screenshots
of the photos without sharing profits with the photographers, nor even
offering them attribution.10
Predictably, most copyright infringement falls in the gray area
between these extremes; for example, George Harrison’s “subconscious

7 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018). This can lead to steep damage awards, even in
cases of innocent infringement. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland,
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 439, 441 (2009) (“Awards of statutory damages are frequently arbitrary,
inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive.”).
8 See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1025, 1065-66 (2016) (defining the principle of equitable allocation as “the risk of
copyright infringement should be allocated in a way that is conducive to robust
opportunities for cultural creation widely dispersed among all members of society. Selfdetermination has a stake in such broad distribution of creative opportunities because
being able to live creative lives either as professionals or amateurs is likely to be central
to the fundamental life path choices of some individuals”) (citations omitted); J. Janewa
Osei-Tutu, Using Intellectual Property Law to Promote Human Flourishing for “Market
Women,” AM. BAR ASS’N (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_
property_law/publications/landslide/2017-18/march-april/using-intellectual-propertylaw-promote-human-flourishing-market-women/
[https://perma.cc/5AWA-YM8P]
(claiming, in the context of female entrepreneurship, that “IP laws can be used as a tool
for promoting human flourishing and human development”).
9 See, e.g., Sir Mashalot, Sir Mashalot: Mind-Blowing SIX Song Country Mashup,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FY8SwIvxj8o
[https://perma.cc/J5EX-UQ73] (featuring six different country music songs that are
effectively indistinguishable); Mike Shear, 5 Most Popular and Common Guitar Chord
Progressions for Song Writers, UBERCHORD (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.uberchord.
com/blog/5-popular-common-guitar-chord-progressions-song-writers/ [https://perma.
cc/LKJ6-K9VB] (explaining how the chord progression I-iV-V7 is used in many popular
songs, from Richie Valens’s La Bamba to The Beatles’s Twist and Shout to The Ting Ting’s
That’s Not My Name).
10 See Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366, 371-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); see also
Andrew R. Chow, Copyright Case over Richard Prince Instagram Show to Go Forward,
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/arts/design/richardprince-instagram-copyright-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/NJ7J-VCYV].
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copying” of The Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine” in his song “My Sweet Lord.”
The Chiffon’s topped the charts with their song “He’s So Fine” in
1963.11 George Harrison released his album All Things Must Pass,
containing the lead single “My Sweet Lord” in 1970.12 Listeners
everywhere noticed the similarity, including Harrison himself: “I wasn’t
consciously aware of the similarity when I wrote the song . . . But once
it started to get a lot of airplay, people started talking about it, and it
was then I thought, ‘Why didn’t I realize?’”13 Ultimately, Harrison was
found guilty of “subconscious copying” — a step down from willful
infringement — and ordered to pay copyright owner Bright Tunes $1.5
million.14
This Essay destabilizes long-held but problematic assumptions about
the interplay between copyright law’s purported goals and its treatment
of infringement by challenging the received wisdom that rightsholders
are necessarily anti-infringement. Specifically, I argue that some
rightsholders don’t just tolerate — but actively monetize —
infringement,15 both explicitly and implicitly, in a variety of different
situations and for one common reason: it benefits them. By the
conventional account, this is an astounding result: Copyright affords
rightsholders a powerful statute against infringement, strict liability,
high damages, and powerfully consolidated industry interests — and
still, some rightsholders explicitly decline the statutory protection in
11 The Chiffons He’s So Fine, ALLMUSIC, https://www.allmusic.com/song/hes-so-finemt0003113623 (last visited July 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K6P5-3SEW].
12 George Harrison All Things Must Pass, ALLMUSIC, https://www.allmusic.com/
album/all-things-must-pass-mw0000194979 (last visited July 6, 2020) [https://perma.
cc/3GYM-VZR8].
13 Lydia Hutchinson, George Harrison’s “My Sweet Lord” Copyright Case,
PERFORMING SONGWRITER BE HEARD (Feb. 10, 2015), http://performingsongwriter.com/
george-harrison-my-sweet-lord/ [https://perma.cc/3ZPG-95GK].
14 See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
15 While some of the examples described herein might also be described as
“unauthorized copying,” I use “infringement” to more accurately describe the positive
state of affairs wherein a rightsholder might forego enforcement of their rights today,
but enforce them tomorrow, or enforce them selectively against some defendants and
not others. It might alternately be suggested that “monetized infringement” effectively
amounts to a gratis, ex-post license such that its monetization renders it no longer
infringing. The ex-post nature of this monetization, its uneven application, and its
concomitant unpredictability, however, prevent monetized infringement from
functioning in any meaningful way like a proper license. Instead, rightsholders who
intend to grant gratis licenses for their work can do so en masse via means such as
Creative Commons. For a list of license types and their descriptions, see About the
Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited July 6,
2020) [https://perma.cc/6W6P-BXWX].
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favor of monetization. What does this tell us about the underlying
statute?
Copyright law’s one-size-fits-all statutory licenses are notoriously illtailored, such that these licenses often serves as penalty defaults.16 In
the copyright context, a “penalty default license” has been defined as
“the use of bounded uncertainty to induce private ordering.”17 By
setting a one-size-fits-all statutory rate that fluctuates every five years,
copyright has built uncertainty into its statutory licenses.18 This
unpredictability makes copyright an ideal case study in how some
rightsholders have improved tailoring by refraining from enforcing their
statutory rights. As with other forms of private ordering, the
government’s role in private enforcement forbearance is to set the
statutory default.19
This Essay is about copyright owners monetizing copyright
infringement, and does not make any claims regarding the overall
efficiency of such infringement. The potential for efficient and/or

16

For a fuller description of this phenomenon, see infra Part III.A.2.
Kristelia García, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1117, 1122 (2014) [hereinafter Penalty Default] (citations omitted).
18 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 804(b)(1) (2018) (describing the process by which statutory
rates are set and changed every five years).
19 See infra Part III.C.
17
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beneficial infringement has been written about extensively, both in the
copyright context20 and elsewhere in intellectual property (“IP”).21
This Essay recognizes that infringement may or may not be efficient,
or socially beneficial, or even desirable. In all of these cases, articulating
a theory of monetized infringement is nonetheless valuable for several
reasons. First, it brings balance to a popular account of rightsholders as
anti-infringement, when in practice they are more of a mixed bag. At
the very least, it calls into question the universality of the assumption
that copyrights must be enforced or incentives will fail.
Moreover, recognition of monetized infringement in copyright is
interesting not only for its unexpectedness, but also for the broader
point that its existence suggests: we have an impoverished descriptive
account of why some laws operate the way that they do. This is
particularly unsettling in an area like copyright, where advocates are
sharply divided along policy lines.22 These divisions tend to have a
20 See, e.g., EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 169-82 (Yale Univ.
Press 2010) (discussing potentially socially productive “copyright disobedience”). For
a detailed account of the potential social value of some copyright infringement, see, for
example, David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1794
(2013), “In a nontrivial number of instances, violating copyright law - like violating
other laws - can serve socially beneficial ends. The exposure of a company’s fraudulent
practices may necessarily entail unauthorized publication of their copyright-protected
internal communications. Infringement may also lead to public dissemination of
culturally enriching materials kept under wraps by owners who want to suppress their
dissemination. Outsider artists may trade on the illegality of their appropriation of
others’ works as a constituent feature of their own creation, requiring infringement to
create their work. Infringement also creates social welfare where it simply enables
beneficial uses that would not have happened otherwise, such as where the mere act of
acquiring permission for a use proves prohibitively costly in comparison to its
internalized value. And even owners may benefit from unauthorized copying of their
works, such as where the copies serve as a powerful advertisement for the owner’s
brand.”; Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 587 (2004), suggesting that some
infringement may be protected: “Courts should recognize that various kinds of copying
. . . promote free speech. . . . The point is not to denigrate fair use, but to recognize that
many kinds of uses of copyrighted material may be justified . . . .”; see also infra Part
I.A.3.c.
21 See, e.g., Kai Yi Xie, Comment, Improving the Patent System by Encouraging
Intentional Infringement: The Beneficial Use Standard of Patents, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1019,
1023 (2017) (arguing that “it is sometimes socially desirable to encourage patent
infringement,” and so proposing that “the government should act to encourage it in
instances where the benefits of infringement outweigh the costs of enforcement”).
22 Compare, for example, this excerpt on creative innovation from the Electronic
Frontier Foundation: “A few media or political interests shouldn’t have unfair
technological or legal advantages over the rest of us. Unfortunately, litigious copyright
and patent owners can abuse the law to inhibit fair use and stifle competition. Internet
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disproportionate, negative impact on less established artists,
intermediaries with fewer resources, and traditionally marginalized
communities.23
More broadly, a theory of monetized infringement reveals the
underappreciated role that private parties play in policymaking. For
example, copyright says that — with the exception of fair use — the
upload of a video containing unlicensed music constitutes infringement
and is punishable by law. Under the auspices of YouTube’s private
fingerprinting technology Content ID, in contrast, many copyright
owners effectively say that the unauthorized upload of a video
containing unlicensed music will not be removed so long as related ad
revenues are relinquished; i.e., so long as they can monetize the potential
infringement (or fair use, as the case may be). Which view describes the
current state of the law? If both — such that the answer is “it depends”
— the user’s conundrum is easy to identify.
Monetized infringement shares some features with, yet is notably
different from, the sort of “tolerated uses” identified by Tim Wu:
“Tolerated use is infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the
owner may be aware, yet does nothing about.”24 The examples in Part
I.B infra go further than toleration to actively monetize infringement,
which begs the question of whether monetized infringement is
infringement at all? As explained herein, I believe the answer is yes,
since there currently exists no mechanism preventing a rightsholder
from selectively and alternately monetizing, and enforcing against,
infringement. This is not the case, for example, under a Creative
Commons license, which affords an in rem — and not an in personam
— right to use. A rightsholder might tolerate, for example, the
unauthorized use of its photograph on a small town church’s fall festival
flyer because infringement suits are costly and there is little to be gained
service providers can give established content companies an advantage over startups
and veto the choices you make in how to use the Internet.” Creativity and Innovation,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/innovation (last visited
July 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/MD4L-T7SR], with that of Creative Futures: “Powerful
internet platforms have spent millions promoting the message that copyright ‘stifles
creativity and innovation.’ They argue that the legal framework that supports your work
is in their way. It has advanced this false claim on social media and blogs, in the
mainstream press, in academia, and in testimony before Congress for years.” Innovation,
CREATIVEFUTURE, https://creativefuture.org/why-this-matters/whosstifling-innovation/
(last visited July 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/73GS-XRL5].
23 See Kristelia A. García & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term,
71 ALA. L. REV. 351, 403-04 (discussing disproportionate impacts of copyright policy
on these groups).
24 Tim Wu, Tolerated Use 3 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 333,
2008).
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from succeeding in this instance. This is substantively different from
encouraging local congregations to make unauthorized use of
copyrighted photos because the rightsholders will in turn receive
valuable promotion that they could not otherwise access.
Private policymaking via nonenforcement raises a set of questions
distinct from those traditionally associated with governmental and
administrative forbearance: What role does the government play?
Should we be more concerned about private forbearance abuses than we
are in the case of governmental forbearance? Can private forbearance
amount to unilateral policymaking? To an abdication of Congress’ will?
This Essay grapples with these, and other, questions as follows:
Through a series of contemporary examples, Part I compares and
contrasts the traditional view of infringement with that of monetized
infringement. Part II discusses some of the most likely impetuses for the
monetization of infringement. Part III details the normative
implications of monetizing infringement, and briefly considers the
government’s role in private policymaking through nonenforcement.
I.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

The law frequently assumes an exogenous preference for a particular
outcome or result. Residential parking restrictions, for example, assume
that residents want to park a vehicle in front of their homes. In reality,
some residents have an endogenous preference to rent or sell their
parking space, and/or prefer to ride their bike or to take public
transportation instead.25 Similarly, copyright law assumes a preference
on the part of rightsholders that their work not be infringed. This Part
uses copyright law as a case study to demonstrate that this preference
does not hold across all rightsholders, some of whom instead monetize
infringement, or permission-less use, in varying circumstances and for
various reasons.
A. The Infringement Problem
The conventional view of copyright infringement is as something to
be deterred wherever possible, and punished (often harshly) otherwise.
Indeed, with the exception of fair use — determined in Lenz v. Universal
to be a complete (and not an affirmative) defense to copyright

25 See, e.g., Mary Meisenzahl, A Parking Space in a Garage in San Francisco is Selling
for $100,000, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 9, 2020, 6:14 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/san-francisco-parking-space-on-sale-for-100000-2020-2 [https://perma.cc/5AS8Z2ZM].
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infringement26 — copyright advocates are generally in agreement that
“protection of [artists’] copyrights is crucial to their ability to earn a
living,” and that infringement “threatens to destroy the ability of
[artists] to sustain themselves economically through the creation and
authorized exploitation of their [ ] works, and does irreparable,
nationwide harm to the ability of creators to protect the quality
and artistic integrity of their works.”27
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress with the authority to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”28 This is presumed to be the
impetus behind the enactment and enforcement of U.S. copyright law.
Copyright’s purported policy goals of both incentivizing creation, and
ensuring access to copyrighted works, is often referred to as the
“incentive-access paradigm.”29
The incentive theory of copyright holds that if artists are denied the
fruit of their labor, they will eventually cease to produce new works and
society will thereby be impoverished.30 There has been some debate in
the literature as to the strength and veracity of this idea in practice. On
the one hand, James Madison makes the case that “[t]he public good
fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.”31 On the other hand,
some commentators have observed that creators may be motivated by
factors other than financial incentives, including personal satisfaction
and self-expression.32
26

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016).
Brief for Nat’l Acad. of Recording Arts & Scis., et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at *5, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 218022.
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 485 (1996) (describing the paradigm by asserting that
“[b]roadening the scope of copyright increases the incentive to produce works of
authorship and results in a greater variety of such works. Broadening copyright’s scope,
however, also limits access to such works both generally, by increasing their price, and
specifically, by limiting the material that others can use to create additional works.
Given these competing considerations, defining copyright’s proper scope has become a
matter of balancing the benefits of broader protection, in the form of increased incentive
to produce such works, against its costs, in the form of lost access to such works”).
30 See id.
31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
32 See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of
Copyright Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2434-35 (2016) (observing that “[t]he
past decade has seen a flood of legal scholarship . . . challeng[ing] the assumption that
money plays much of a role at all in motivating artistic production, suggesting instead
27
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In any event, this Essay does not take issue with the incentive theory,
which it takes at face value, but rather with its extension — namely,
that infringement disincentivizes creators by denying them the ability to
extract value from their works. Instead, I argue that it may, or it may not.
I do not aim herein to determine whether infringement is “good” or
“bad” (nor for whom), but rather whether — as the law assumes —
rightsholders are necessarily harmed by infringement. I argue that
sometimes they are, but sometimes they aren’t. In other words, it’s not
just that some rightsholders forbear from enforcing their rights (some
do), but rather that some actually monetize the trespass as a means of
creating value. Before turning to specific examples of this in Part I.B.,
the following sections describe the current state of the statutory law, the
case law, and the scholarly literature, as they relate to copyright
infringement.
1.

Statutory & Legislative Background

Section 501 of the Copyright Act defines an infringer as “[a]nyone
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in
section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the
United States in violation of section 602[.]”33 Where the owner of a
valid copyright believes they have been infringed, they are “entitled,
subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the
owner of it.”34

that the desire for subcultural status or the intrinsic enjoyment of the creative process
are stronger drivers of creative production. Other research has shown that factors
foreign to U.S. law, like the desire for attribution, play a persistent role in authors’
incentives”) (citations omitted); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 82 (1998) (describing
“three identifiably separate personhood interests in an intellectual property res: (1)
creativity; (2) intentionality; and (3) identification as the source of the res”) (citations
omitted); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension
of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1947 (2006) (highlighting the
“spiritual or inspirational motivations that are inherent in the creative task itself as
opposed to motivation resulting from the possibility of economic reward”).
33 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2018).
34 Id. § 501(b).
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Remedies available to rightsholders include injunction,35
impounding,36 monetary damages,37 attorneys costs,38 and, in some
cases, criminal penalties.39 Monetary damages may be awarded as actual
damages or as statutory damages.40 Statutory damages range from $750
to $30,000 per work infringed, increasing to as much as $150,000 in
cases of willful infringement.41
Copyright infringement is generally understood to be a strict liability
tort: 42 “Copyright infringement is a strict liability wrong in the sense
that a plaintiff need not prove wrongful intent or culpability in order to
prevail.”43 The Supreme Court has affirmed this view: “[i]ntention to
infringe is not essential under the [Copyright] Act.”44 As Tony Reese
explains:
[E]arlier statutes expressly made sales of unauthorized copies
infringing only if made with knowledge that the copies were
unauthorized; also, for many kinds of works, infringement by
imitation was penalized only if the defendant had intended to
evade the law. By contrast, the 1909 Act merely enumerated the
exclusive rights to which a copyright owner was entitled but
never expressly defined infringement and articulated no
knowledge or mental-state requirement for any violations. The
express limitations of earlier U.S. copyright statutes as to sales
and derivative works thus disappeared from U.S. copyright law
upon the enactment of the 1909 Act . . . The 1976 Act [under
which we currently operate] maintained the same approach,
including essentially no mental-state limits on liability for direct
infringement.45
Some scholars have been critical of this standard — for example, Ben
Depoorter and Robert Kirk Walker have noted that “[e]ven for affluent
defendants, overcoming the Copyright Act’s strict liability standard is
35

Id. § 502.
Id. § 503.
37 Id. § 504.
38 Id. § 505.
39 Id. § 506.
40 Id. § 504(a).
41 Id. § 504(c).
42 See supra note 6.
43 Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
44 Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931).
45 R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 179 (2007).
36
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highly burdensome.”46 Nonetheless, liability for “innocent infringers”
appears to be an intentional feature — and not a bug — of the current
system. According to a 1958 report of the Copyright Office:
The general features of the law of innocent infringement were
shaped prior to 1909. Except for the innocent vendor,
innocence or lack of intent to infringe was not generally a
defense to an action for infringement. There is considerable
evidence that this situation was realized by those participating
in the drafting and enactment of the 1909 act; although the
problem of the innocent infringer was considered at some
length in the hearings, the 1909 statute contained no broad
provisions excusing innocent infringers. Moreover, the act
eliminated the provision in earlier statutes expressly protecting
the innocent seller.47
Of course, the threat of high statutory damages serves not only to
punish, but also to deter, copyright infringement — and sometimes to
deter potential fair uses. The problem, as described by Pamela
Samuelson and Tara Wheatland, is that “[a]wards of statutory damages
are frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes
grossly excessive.”48 This is especially true in the digital age: “There is
a growing understanding that statutory damage awards . . . are a poor
fit for the digital age. Because a statutory damage award is set for each
individual infringed work, the total damages can add up significantly
for online infringements that involve multiple works.”49 The takeaway:
copyright infringement is sufficiently harmful that it merits severe
punishment and harsh deterrence.
2.

Judicial Consensus

The case law on copyright infringement treats it primarily as a matter
of either (i) wrongful appropriation, or (ii) disincentivization. In the
46 Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 319, 343 (2013); see also Kelly Cassey Mullally, Blocking Copyrights Revisited,
37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 57, 83 (2013) (criticizing copyright’s “harsh strict liability
standard”).
47 STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY NO. 25: LIABILITY OF INNOCENT INFRINGERS
OF COPYRIGHTS 141 (Alan Latman & William S. Tager) (Comm. Print 1958) (citations
omitted).
48 Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 7, at 441.
49 Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: When the Remedy is the
Wrong, 66 UCLA L. REV. 400, 404 (2019) (citations omitted).
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seminal case of Arnstein v. Porter, the Second Circuit considered an
allegation of copying by a songwriter, and determined that “The
question . . . is whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much
of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”50
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court concluded that “it should not
be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine
of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.”51 This view confirms a long line of cases describing
infringement as something to be deterred and/or punished, lest it lead
to less creation, and an impoverished collective: “The immediate effect
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the
creation of useful works] for the general public good.”52 Again, the clear
message is that copyright infringement is bad — not just for creators,
but also for society in general.
3.

Scholarly Discord

There are several distinct schools of thought in the literature on
copyright infringement: One — pecuniary infringement — is concerned
with potential instances of pecuniary harm resulting from infringement.
Another — non-pecuniary infringement — considers various nonpecuniary harms that may stem from infringement. Finally, some
infringement can be viewed as potentially socially beneficial. Each of
these types are discussed in turn below.
a.

Pecuniary Infringement

Copyright infringement is unlawful. The conventional scholarly
account explains this by maintaining that “[c]opyright infringement
hurts artists financially, and it also discourages further creativity and

50 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
51 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
52 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).

280

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 54:265

innovation.”53 This is arguably bad for both artists and consumers: “As
musicians are less able to rely on royalties to make a living, they spend
less time on their craft and more time searching for alternative sources
of income — much to the detriment of audiences.”54
There is a similar line of comparative scholarship comparing the
experience of artists in countries with less copyright protection to that
enjoyed by U.S. artists, and finding the foreign systems wanting. For
example, in an article analyzing the Chinese market, Jiarui Liu observes
that “copyright incentives . . . preserve[] market conditions for gifted
musicians to prosper, including a decent standard of living, sufficient
income to cover production costs and maximum artistic autonomy
during the creative process.”55 That body of literature describes
copyright as an economic driver. For example, Sandra Aistars and her
co-authors note that, “WIPO found that there are strong and positive
relationships between the contributions of the copyright industries to
GDP and many indicators of socio-economic performance.”56
b.

Non-pecuniary Infringement

While the harm resulting from copyright infringement is often framed
in terms of decreased financial incentives and diminished economic
benefit, it may alternately (or additionally) be based on moral, or
reputational, concerns. For example, in a recent lawsuit filed by
renowned romance author Nora Roberts against a Brazilian writer she
says copied whole passages from her novels, the concern is less about
money and incentives — Roberts is one of the most successful novelists
in the world, after all — and more about moral and reputational harm.
To borrow Roberts’s own words, the alleged plagiarizer is a “blood leech
sucking on the body of the writing profession.”57

53 Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict Between
Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 195, 195 (2006).
54 Sandra Aistars, Devlin Hartline & Mark Schultz, Copyright Principles and
Priorities to Foster a Creative Digital Marketplace, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 769, 778
(2016).
55 Jiarui Liu, Copyright for Blockheads: An Empirical Study of Market Incentive and
Intrinsic Motivation, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 473 (2015).
56 Aistars et al., supra note 54, at 777 (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
WIPO STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 2-3 (2014),
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/performance/pdf/economic_
contribution_analysis_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2C9-LD9P]).
57 Michael Schaub, Romance Author Nora Roberts Sues Brazilian Writer, Claiming
Plagiarism, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/books/la-et-jc-noraroberts-sues-cristiane-serruya-20190425-story.html [https://perma.cc/2ZGZ-QXSD].
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In an article considering why and how copyright owners decide to
sue, Christopher Buccafusco and David Fagundes note a variety of
copyright infringement suits “rooted in non-pecuniary motivations . . .
[, including] a pro-choice group suing a pro-life group for its criticism
of the former’s videos; Michael Savage suing the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations to facilitate his anti-Muslim rants; a widow suing a
documentarian whose film painted an unflattering portrait of her
deceased husband; and songwriters Don Henley and Jackson Browne
suing politicians whose views they dislike for using their works at
campaign rallies.” 58 Ultimately, Buccafusco and Fagundes determine
that while copyright law “assumes that owners will sue only to redress
monetary losses, [] [they] actually sue for a variety of reasons, including
under circumstances that appear unrelated to that concern.”59 In his
work on IP in non-traditional contexts, Andrew Gilden likewise
observes the emergence of “a diverse new generation of IP owners,”
whose interests are “markedly different than the traditional
beneficiaries of IP laws,” leading them to “often pursue IP disputes for
reasons having little to do with revenue streams, creativity, or
intellectual labor.”60
c.

Socially Beneficial Infringement

Not all commentators, however, view infringement as necessarily
bad. There exists a small but well-developed body of work that focuses
on infringement resulting in an arguable social benefit. This literature
does not necessarily allege a benefit enjoyed equally (or at all) by all
parties.
For example, in his work on efficient copyright infringement, David
Fagundes describes how “[t]he exposure of a company’s fraudulent
practices may necessarily entail unauthorized publication of their
copyright-protected internal communications.”61 This, he suggests,
might be described as societally beneficial infringement. Similarly,
Rebecca Tushnet has described a potential conflict between the rule
against copyright infringement and first amendment rights that might
suggest an opening for socially beneficial infringement. She notes, for
example, the import of some copyrighted works for social participation:

58

Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 32, at 2453.
Id. at 2478-79.
60 Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 67,
73 (2018).
61 Fagundes, supra note 20, at 1794.
59
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If The Sopranos or Queer as Folk have a significant impact on
our culture, then access to those programs improves a person’s
ability to participate in making and interpreting that culture.
There could be a problem for democracy when copyright
owners set prices so high that some people can’t read or watch
what many others do. Letting people who have HBO write
Sopranos fan fiction without fear of the copyright police is well
and good, but they still need access to HBO in the first place;
without access, there can be no derivative works and no water
cooler conversation.62
Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal describe the unauthorized
screening of the acclaimed documentary Eyes on the Prize by
anticopyright activist group Downhill Battle as another example of
socially beneficial infringement. By 2005, many of the licenses
originally obtained for the 1987 film had expired, leading it to become
“for all practical purposes, unavailable to the general public.”63 In
protest, Downhill Battle “digitized the first three episodes of the
documentary and posted them online, where the episodes could be
downloaded for free using peer-to-peer software, like BitTorrent. Then,
Downhill Battle encouraged people to copy and distribute the files in
order to raise awareness of copyright’s effect on the circulation of
information.”64
In the fair use context, Jeanne Fromer has written that “some courts
have begun to recognize that market benefits ought to count in favor of
finding that a defendant’s use if fair . . . Similarly, copyright holders –
including those that have been litigiously protective of their
copyrighted material in the past . . . are increasingly acting in ways that
suggest they realize that certain unauthorized third-party uses of their
copyrighted works can redound to their financial benefit.”65 She cites
notorious copyright enforcer Disney as an example.66 The company’s
megahit franchise Frozen has spawned everything from fan cover videos
to makeup tutorials for how to look like Princesses Elsa and Anna.67 In
62

Tushnet, supra note 20, at 545-46.
PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 20, at 3.
64 Id. at 5.
65 Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 61718 (2015). By way of example, Fromer offers Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954
F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), in which the court “reason[ed] that Google Book
Search’s service can drive book sales and increased attention to long-forgotten books.”
Id. at 618 n.14.
66 Id. at 634.
67 See id. at 634 n.107.
63
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contrast with its heavy-handed enforcement strategy of the past, some
commentators have observed that Disney appears to have “learned to
stop worrying and love copyright infringement,” or at least, in the
(in)famous (almost-)words of Princess Elsa, “how to let copyright go.”68
As the foregoing discussion suggests, much of the scholarship on
copyright infringement has focused on whether or not it is (or can be)
societally harmful, or beneficial, and when. All of the examples in this
subsection involve infringement that is not beneficial to the
rightsholder. Despite the fact that copyright enforcement lies primarily
with rightsholders,69 the literature has paid little attention to whether
or when infringement might not only be tolerated, but actually
monetized, by rightsholders themselves, regardless of its social merit.70
The next subpart will consider this question as a matter of first
impression.
B. The Infringement Solution
Notwithstanding the long-held view of infringement as antirightsholder, some rightsholders not only tolerate — but actively
monetize — infringement, in a variety of different situations and for a
variety of different reasons. This subpart introduces the concept of
“monetized infringement” through a series of case studies from the
music, television, film, publishing, and video game industries. The
examples are presented in accordance with the following taxonomy: (1)
profitable infringement, in which infringement (or potential
infringement) results in income for the rightsholder; (2) remedial
infringement, in which infringement (or potential infringement)
mitigates a worse outcome for the rightsholder; and (3) promotional
infringement, in which infringement (or potential infringement)
amounts to valuable and cost-efficient promotion for the rightsholder’s
content. There is, of course, some overlap between these categories. For
example, a valuable promotional infringement might also be classified
68 Andrew Leonard, How Disney Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Copyright
Infringement, SALON (May 23, 2014, 8:43 PM), https://www.salon.com/2014/05/23/
how_disney_learned_to_stop_worrying_and_love_copyright_infringement/ [https://perma.
cc/NG44-B2TN].
69 The exception to this is in the case of criminal copyright infringement, which is
enforced by the federal government. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2018).
70 The closest work along these lines is a symposium piece by Tim Wu in which he
writes about ex post notice rights. There, he defines “tolerated uses” as “technically
infringing, but nonetheless tolerated.” Wu, supra note 24, at 1. This Essay moves
beyond mere tolerance to explore situations in which infringement is actively
encouraged because of an explicit benefit (or expected benefit) to the right holder.
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as a profitable infringement. A profitable infringement, such as Content
ID, might also be a form of remedial infringement: a suboptimal
arrangement that is nonetheless more efficient than Section 512’s notice
and takedown procedure. Nonetheless, these categories serve as helpful
buckets for the exploration of this phenomenon.
An important exception bears mention here: “entrapment” of
infringers is not monetized infringement. For example, in 2013, it came
to light that notorious copyright troll Prenda Law had uploaded its own
videos to various torrent sites, then turned around and sued users who
downloaded them.71 While these hapless downloaders’ actions were
ultimately monetized, this Essay explicitly excludes this manner of
“business model,” not least of all because the benefit to the rightsholder
is taken at the expense of the user. In other words, copyright trolling is
explicitly excluded from this Essay’s definition of “monetized
infringement.”
1.

Profitable Infringement

Some private rightsholders leverage infringement (or potential
infringement) because it is better for business. Subsection (a) infra
discusses an example in which the rightsholders’ business model itself
explicitly relies upon (potential and actual) infringement in order to be
profitable. Subsection (b) infra describes a business model that has
adapted to substitute one form of revenue for another — in this case,
one that is not only unharmed by, but also potentially improved upon,
by infringement.
a.

Ad-Supported Content

By early 2007, online video streaming service YouTube boasted nearly
seventy million users, collectively watching billions of videos per day.72
Many of these videos were user-uploaded, and contained content that
did not belong to the user, and for which the user had not obtained a
license nor authorization to use. Some of these videos — dancing

71 See Joe Mullin, Comcast Letter Said to Confirm That Prenda, Steele Planted Porn
Torrents, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:53 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2013/08/comcast-letter-said-to-confirm-that-prenda-steele-planted-porn-torrents/
[https://perma.cc/D2TA-ALRX].
72 YouTube Continues to Lead U.S. Online Video Market with 28 Percent Market Share,
According to Comscore Video Matrix, COMSCORE (Nov. 30, 2007), https://www.
comscore.com/Insights/Press-Releases/2007/11/YouTube-Leads-US-Online-VideoMarket#:~:text=Other%20notable%20findings%20from%20September,viewers%20and
%201.1%20million%20videos [https://perma.cc/CA4E-6GAD].

2020]

Monetizing Infringement

285

toddlers, crazy cats and the like — most likely qualify as fair use. Others
— including the infamous lyric videos, or still shots with audio73 — are
most likely infringing. Monetizing user uploads necessarily loops in
both types of content, with only the latter qualifying as monetized
infringement. Historically, YouTube (and similarly situated services)
have enjoyed an exemption from secondary copyright liability for
infringing “user-generated content” (“UGC”) under the Section 512
safe harbor.74 Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) provides that “[a] service provider shall not be liable for . . .
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a
user . . . if the service provider…does not have actual knowledge . . . is
not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent; or upon obtaining such knowledge . . . acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material[.]”75
Despite the existence of this safe harbor, the sheer quantity of
infringing UGC led YouTube to find itself potentially secondarily liable
for a massive amount of copyright infringement. This is because Section
512’s protection extends only to online service providers (“OSPs”)
without knowledge of the alleged infringement.76 The thrust of most
content owners’ argument against YouTube was that the company was
not only aware of rampant infringement — after all, Viacom demanded
they remove over 100,000 videos containing the company’s content in
2007 alone77 — but was also arguably encouraging it by failing to
implement any meaningful deterrent against, or punishment for, users

73 For domestic and international users without the financial means and/or
technical ability to access music streaming services, “lyric videos” — streaming audio
with the words scrolling across the screen — fill the gap. The overwhelming majority
of videos viewed on YouTube are music videos, and a significant number of those are
user-uploaded lyric videos (i.e., infringing). See, e.g., Joan E. Solsman, The Surprising
Rise of YouTube Lyrics Videos, CNET (Aug. 31, 2014, 4:00 AM PT),
https://www.cnet.com/news/the-rise-and-rise-of-youtube-lyrics-videos/ [https://perma.
cc/5C6C-ZU5H]. Despite their illegality, there even appears to exist some sort of
pyramid scheme (falsely) promising lyric videos as a substantial source of income for
fans. See, e.g., rob_level, How to Make $400 a Day Making Lyric Videos (NO JOKE!),
SMARTRAPPER, https://www.smartrapper.com/make-400-day-making-lyric-videos-nojoke/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U5MB-YZGJ].
74 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 122-23
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013) (confirming YouTube’s protection under 512(c)).
75 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2018).
76 Id.
77 Geraldine Fabrikant & Saul Hansell, Viacom Asks YouTube to Remove Clips, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/02/technology/02cnd-tube.html
[https://perma.cc/MCW4-3QFD].
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found to be in violation of the law (and, indeed, YouTube’s own terms
of service).78
And so YouTube found itself in a pickle: With the looming threat of
crippling copyright infringement litigation from content owners on one
side, and the promise of massive advertising revenues tied to usergenerated content on the other, what’s a multibillion dollar company to
do? In YouTube’s case, then-CEO Eric Schmidt decided to invest in
what was then a relatively new technology: “audio fingerprinting.”79
Initially, YouTube utilized technology belonging to Audible Magic, a
pioneer in the field.80 Eventually, YouTube teamed up with content
owners to develop a proprietary system — initially called “Video
Identification,”81 and later renamed “Content ID.”82 Content ID works
by ingesting files provided by content owners, and then doing two
things: (1) scouring existing content to identify any potentially
infringing uploads; and (2) comparing newly uploaded files to the
owner-provided files to halt upload of potentially infringing uploads.83
In either case, where a potential match is identified, the content
owner is presented with several options: (i) They can report the user in
accordance with Section 512’s notice-and-takedown procedure;
78 See Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=CA&
template=terms#2ec77765bd (last visited July 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DN9V-SF7C].
YouTube’s Community Guidelines state that “the Content you submit must not include
third-party intellectual property (such as copyrighted material) unless you have
permission from that party or are otherwise legally entitled to do so. You are legally
responsible for the Content you submit to the Service. We may use automated systems
that analyze your Content to help detect infringement and abuse, such as spam,
malware, and illegal content.” Id.
79 See Kevin J. Delaney, YouTube to Test Software to Ease Licensing Fights, WALL ST.
J. (June 12, 2007, 11:59 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1181612956269
32114 [https://perma.cc/4LAQ-K7UG]. “Audio fingerprinting” refers to technology that
enables the automatic detection and identification of copyrighted work on a platform.
Id.
80 Andy Maxwell, Audible Magic Accuses YouTube of Fraud over Content ID
Trademark, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 11, 2017), https://torrentfreak.com/audible-magicaccuses-youtube-of-fraud-over-content-id-trademark-170111/ [https://perma.cc/TD646HBY].
81 YouTube
Advertisers, Video Identification, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWizsV5Le7s [https://perma.cc/WAW6-BU8T].
82 See YouTube Creators, YouTube Content ID, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9g2U12SsRns [https://perma.cc/7LDN-E2AH].
83 See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/2797370?hl=en#:~:text=How%20Content%20ID%20works,to%20us%20by%2
0content%20owners.&text=When%20this%20happens%2C%20the%20video%20gets
%20a%20Content%20ID%20claim (last visited July 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5GFWVCPE].
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(ii) they can block the infringing video on the upload, thereby keeping
it off of the site altogether; or (iii) they can elect to allow the allegedly
infringing video to upload, and then claim the ad revenues earned
against it.84 This last option effectively monetizes what might otherwise
amount to infringement (along with some fair use). It also amounts to
a real-time license, and is by far the most popular option among
rightsholders.85 Preferred partners (e.g., major record labels) also have
access to a manual claiming tool that allows them to search the site for
very minor (or inconsequential) uses of their content (such that
Content ID’s bot is unlikely to catch them) and to then claim revenues
from those videos on a one-off basis. Unsurprisingly, alleged abuses of
the manual claiming tool have led YouTube to reevaluate its policy with
regard to manual monetization.86 The tool’s popularity, however,
confirms rightsholders’ affinity for infringing (or potentially infringing)
UGC that they can convert to income via Content ID.87
With Content ID in place, YouTube continues to dominate the global
video streaming industry.88 Between them, the three major record labels
— Universal, Sony, and Warner — reported $3.24 billion in streaming
revenues for the first half of 2018.89 That’s up 36.4% from the same time
84 See Paul Resnikoff, 99.5% of All Infringing Music Videos Are Resolved by Content ID,
YouTube Claims, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.digitalmusicnews.
com/2016/08/08/copyright-problems-resolved-content-id/ [https://perma.cc/4APS-JRAK].
85 See id. (“Content ID accounts for roughly 50% of the music industry’s revenue
from YouTube.”).
86 Sarah Perez, YouTube Shuts Down Music Companies’ Use of Manual Copyright
Claims to Steal Creator Revenue, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 16, 2019, 6:56 AM PDT),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/16/youtube-shuts-down-music-companies-use-ofmanual-copyright-claims-to-steal-creator-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/TJ9S-68W6].
87 NB: The mere existence of Content ID and participation of the content partners
does not automatically “license” the latter’s content to YouTube. The only thing
automatic about Content ID is its initial hold on UGC; it then falls to the content owner
to decide whether to allow (i.e., encourage) or disallow (i.e., enforce against) the
potential infringement.
88 See INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., MUSIC CONSUMER INSIGHT REPORT 13
(2018), https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Music-Consumer-Insight-Report-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4P3-KETZ] (“47% of time spent listening to on-demand music
[worldwide] is on YouTube.”). One commentator has suggested that Article 17 of the
European Union’s new Digital Single Market (“DSM”) Directive effectively codifies
YouTube’s business model, paving the way for more encouraged infringement
worldwide. See Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music
Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323, 357 (2020) (“In
Content ID, YouTube has a prebuilt compliance infrastructure for Article 17. That’s
because Article 17 was designed for Content ID and not vice versa.”).
89 Tim Ingham, The Major Labels Now Turn Over More Than $1BN a Month. But
Who’s Ruling 2018?, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.
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period in 2017.90 From a user perspective, far fewer are startled to find
their uploaded video “disappeared” from the site, thereby leaving more
content available for the public to consume. A real win-win-win, right?
Not necessarily.
Content ID is not available to all content owners, only to select (i.e.,
major — both in terms of financials and in terms of star power)
partners.91 Smaller content owners are left to the (relatively inefficient)
notice-and-takedown regime of Section 512(c). Likewise, users may not
find their uploads missing, but — if the upload contained any content
picked up by Content ID and monetized by a content partner — they
won’t earn any ad share revenue on them either. That money goes
instead to the content partner who has opted to monetize a piece of
allegedly infringing UGC under the terms of Content ID. The more
infringing (or even potentially infringing) content is uploaded by users,
the more a content owner can claim, and the more money can be made.
Importantly, this is true even where a claimed UGC video may be fair
use. While the law post-Lenz technically requires a fair use analysis
before a video is taken down under Section 512,92 it says nothing about
leaving a video up and claiming the revenue around it. This is
something YouTube and its Content ID partners have accomplished via
contract and terms of service. For example, a Content ID FAQ helpfully
titled “Am I in trouble?” assures the worried recipient of a claim notice:
Probably not. . . . It’s up to the copyright owners to decide
whether or not others can reuse their original material.93
Copyright owners often allow their content to be used in
YouTube videos in exchange for having ads run on those

musicbusinessworldwide.com/the-major-labels-now-turn-over-more-than-1bn-a-monthbut-whos-ruling-2018/ [https://perma.cc/HU4M-E56E].
90 Id.
91 For an account of the small creator’s experience vis-à-vis Content ID, see The
Music Business Made Easy, How to Apply for YouTube Content ID, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dC15sdHa2DA [https://perma.cc/LQ72AQVQ] (noting that “most times, applications that come from individuals . . . are
rejected”).
92 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We
hold that the statute requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a
takedown notification[.]”).
93 This, of course, is only legally accurate where the reuse is not fair, but the FAQ
does not get into that, presumably because Content ID operates under its own set of
rules separate and apart from copyright. For more on this possibility, see Matthew Sag,
Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
499, 522 (2017) [hereinafter Safe Harbors], discussing the potential displacement of
copyright law by “DMCA plus” agreements such as Content ID.

2020]

Monetizing Infringement

289

videos. . . . Sometimes, you can’t monetize a video that has a
Content ID claim. Instead, the copyright owners can choose to
monetize your video.94
And herein lies the rub: under Content ID, more potentially
infringing UGC (along with some fair use that may nonetheless be
claimed) equals more money for rightsholders. Record labels no longer
have to spend millions of dollars creating a promotional music video
and hoping it goes viral; instead, they can sit back and let fans create
them, share them, and popularize them, with every click amounting to
more ad revenues for the rightsholder. Importantly, participation in
Content ID also does not amount to a de facto license, since a content
owner can claim one video while blocking another. This Essay intends
no normative evaluation of whether this arrangement is “better” or
“worse” than any other; rather, it aims only to emphasize that the
rightsholders in this example are often benefited — and not harmed —
by (potential and actual) infringement.
b.

Downloadable Content

In 2018, video game revenue in the U.S. topped $43.8 billion, making
it more lucrative than the entire American film industry.95 One of the
most successful video game developers — a company called Electronic
Arts (“EA”) — is behind such blockbuster series as The Sims, FIFA,
Madden NFL, and Battlefield.96 With total net revenue topping $5 billion
in 2018,97 EA is a popular target for game pirates. To put video game
piracy in perspective, “[t]he music industry loses $12.5 billion to pirates
annually. Current trends project the film and television industry will hit

94 What is a Content ID Claim?, YouTube Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.
com/youtube/answer/6013276?hl=en (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
C442-DW3P].
95 Jonathan Shieber, Video Game Revenue Tops $43 Billion in 2018, an 18% Jump from
2017, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 22, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/22/video-gamerevenue-tops-43-billion-in-2018-an-18-jump-from-2017/ [https://perma.cc/T8Y4-C6DV].
96 For a comprehensive list of Electronic Arts’ game library, see generally
ELECTRONIC ARTS, https://www.ea.com/games/library (last visited June 30, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/R79W-MZLB].
97 Electronic Arts Reports, Q4 FY18 and Full Year FY18 Financial Results, ELECTRONIC
ARTS (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.ea.com/news/electronic-arts-reports-q4-fy18financial-results [https://perma.cc/DHM4-4QQ5 ].
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$52 billion in losses to pirates by 2022. And in 2014, [it is] estimated
the video game industry lost $74 billion to pirates.”98
These statistics should suggest that piracy is particularly bad for video
games.99 Indeed, over the years, the video game industry has tried a
variety of different approaches — many of them highly creative — to
thwart piracy of their games. Before digital downloading of games, game
developers could check piracy by requiring players to enter, for
example, a code printed on the physical box in which the game was
packaged. If the player didn’t have a code, or if the code had already
been used (presumably by the original, lawful owner) the game
wouldn’t play, or might throw the player in video game “jail” where
they’d have to listen to a lecture on piracy.100
Of course, the evolution of digital gaming reduced the effectiveness
of this approach, leading some companies to rely on other mechanisms,
ranging from user shaming to game degradation. For example, game
developer Remedy shames pirates of its popular game Quantum Break
by slapping a skull-and-bones eye patch over the main character, Jack
Joyce, whenever a pirated copy is detected.101 One of the most popular
games of all time, The Sims, has discouraged pirates of The Sims 4 via
programming that makes pirated copies increasingly pixelated and
blurry over time.102 Pirates of Crysis Warhead find their bullets and
grenades replaced by hapless (and harmless) chickens.103 One of the
more vengeful approaches, and this author’s personal favorite, was
devised by the creators of Super Nintendo’s Earthbound. Pirates face a
much tougher game than legal players, only to be “rewarded” at the very
end by the game freezing and wiping all saved copies.104
98 Kirk Kaczmarek, The Unwinnable War on Video Game Piracy, RICH. J.L. & TECH.
BLOG (Feb. 9, 2019), https://jolt.richmond.edu/2019/02/09/the-unwinnable-war-onvideo-game-piracy/ [https://perma.cc/86LB-3754].
99 Alternately, they might suggest an ill-founded assumption that every pirated copy
would have otherwise been purchased at full retail price.
100 Brad Chacos, 12 Hilarious, Brutally Devious Ways Game Developers Punish Pirates,
PC WORLD (Apr. 9, 2016, 7:07 AM PDT), https://www.pcworld.com/article/
2602876/10-hilarious-brutally-devious-ways-pc-game-developers-punish-pirates.html
#slide11 [https://perma.cc/V4TU-6BTK].
101 Id. Developers use a host of different methods to detect pirated copies; one of the
most popular methods is to “leak” a modified version of the game to torrent sites (which
modification identifies a pirated copy). These versions generally contain an “easter egg”
which results in corruption, an altered gaming experience (e.g., extra hard levels), and
even memory deletion. See id.
102 Id.
103 See D. P., Crysis Warhead Chicken Bullets, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gemaltF85oQ [https://perma.cc/RS2V-QN5E].
104 Chacos, supra note 100.
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More recently, however, the industry generally — and EA in
particular — has had a change of heart. In an interview with a popular
gamer blog, EA’s then-CEO John Riccitiello quipped: “By the way, if
there are any pirates you’re writing for, please encourage them to pirate
FIFA Online, NBA Street Online, Battleforge, Battlefield Heroes . . . If they
would just pirate lots of it I’d love them. [laughs] Because what’s in the
middle of the game is an opportunity to buy stuff.”105 Similarly, Gabe
Newell, Founder and Managing Director of software developer Valve,
recently called pirates “underserved customers,” and added, “[I can]
make some interesting money off of it.”106
This sentiment is a far cry from the doomsday scenarios predicted by
execs of years past. So what gives? Why are the creators and copyright
owners of popular video games courting the very people who infringe
those copyrights? The explanation is fairly straightforward: In the new
video game business model, they aren’t selling the copyrighted work —
in this case, the video game — rather, they are selling downloadable
content (or “DLC” in industry-speak) that operates from inside of the
game.
Originally devised as a means of generating long-term (as opposed to
one-shot) revenue on a sold game, DLC is additional content that can
be downloaded within a video game. Common types of DLC include
extra levels, new characters, additional weapons/vehicles, and custom
outfits.107 While a single DLC purchase tends to cost far less than the
price of a game, multiple DLC purchases — for example, developer
Activision offers players of Modern Warfare a new level every few
months108 — can add up to far more spending over time than the onetime purchase of a game. While you can pirate a copy of Modern
Warfare, you won’t be able to customize your characters nor play the
newly released levels without shelling out money for in-game DLC. In
other words, pirates can “steal the disc[/game], but they can’t steal the
DLC.”109 This is because the DLC is purchased through connection
105 Ben Kuchera, EA’s New Motto: Please Pirate Our Games…er, Storefronts, ARS
TECHNICA (June 23, 2009, 8:07 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2009/06/eas-newmotto-please-pirate-our-games-er-storefronts/ [https://perma.cc/YK5B-PXF7].
106 Mike Masnick, Valve Exec Explains How to Compete with Privacy, TECHDIRT (Feb.
19, 2009, 11:47 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090219/1124433835.shtml
[https://perma.cc/L5E6-57N9].
107 DLC Definition, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/dlc (last visited Jan.
10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V7V6-SQPM].
108 Id.
109 General Discussion - EA’s Stance on Piracy, GIANT BOMB, https://www.giantbomb.
com/forums/general-discussion-30/eas-stance-on-piracy-377362/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2020) [https://perma.cc/Y78G-5DY8].
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between a legitimate copy of the game and the developer’s store
server.110 Without access to purchase DLC, the pirated game is rendered
largely worthless. Infringement, then, becomes just another way of
getting the game developers’ real product — DLC — in front of more
potential customers.
The potential network effects from an enhanced user base — one
facilitated, in part, by monetized infringement — is hard to overstate.
The entire business model behind “software as a service” (“SaaS”), for
example, depends on lots of installations at low- to no-cost, followed by
the sale of upgrades and premium versions once a user (and a user’s
network) has become dependent upon the product.111 The file-hosting
service Dropbox, for example, is free up to two gigabytes. Once users
exceed the free allotment, they can upgrade to Dropbox Plus (two
terabytes for $9.99/month) or Dropbox Professional (three terabytes for
$16.58/month).112
Before SaaS, there was piracy as a means of competition suppression:
At first, Microsoft tolerated rampant piracy of its operating system
(“OS”) in China because, as then-CEO Bill Gates famously said, “As
long as they’re going to steal [software], we want them to steal ours.”113
Today, the company actively rewards pirates by offering upgrades of all
outdated Microsoft operating systems — legitimate and pirated — to
the latest version for free. Why? Because “Microsoft is making a
strategic play to get as many users hooked on the Windows 10 platform
as possible. . . . The more users Microsoft gets now, the more services it
can sell downstream — and it’s hoping even pirates can be flipped into
paying customers.”114

110 See, e.g., Robert Earl Wells III, What is DLC in Gaming and How Does it Work?,
LIFEWIRE (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-dlc-in-gaming-how-does-itwork-4707377#:~:text=The%20inside%20scoop%20on%20downloadable%20content
&text=Downloadable%20content%2C%20or%20DLC%2C%20is,DLC%20to%20make
%20a%20profit [https://perma.cc/FS2L-6RSF] (explaining the process of purchasing
DLC).
111 See, e.g., Claire Brenner, What is SaaS? A Software-as-a-Service Guide, LEARNING
HUB (Apr. 16, 2018), https://learn.g2.com/what-is-saas#what-is-saas [https://perma.cc/
5GRG-TX2Z] (describing Business to Consumer SaaS business model).
112 Choose Your Dropbox Personal Plan, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/
individual (last visited Jul. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/75Q9-H4R3].
113 Gates, Buffett a Bit Bearish, CNET (July 2, 1998, 5:00 AM PT),
https://www.cnet.com/news/gates-buffett-a-bit-bearish/ [https://perma.cc/8U87-AH3Q].
114 Dan Kedmey, Here’s Why Microsoft Is Giving Pirates the Next Windows for Free,
TIME (Mar. 20, 2015, 1:06 PM EDT), https://time.com/3749434/microsoft-windows-10pirates-free/ [https://perma.cc/PZ4X-US9Z].

2020]
2.

Monetizing Infringement

293

Remedial Infringement

This section presents an example of cost savings accomplished by
affirmatively encouraging infringement as the lesser of two evils. In
other words, I would rather not have a bunch of noisy birds squawking
on the tree outside my bedroom window every morning, but since I’ve
come to accept that they will be there no matter what I do, I can at least
entice them to the side of the tree farthest from where I park my car
(and so avoid a barrage of bird droppings) by placing a bird feeder there.
This Essay refers to this as encouraging “remedial infringement.”
The remedial approach is taken by some video game developers for
whom piracy is not the only — nor, importantly, the worst — problem.
For these rightsholders, so-called “gray market resellers” present the
greatest challenge. Gray market resellers resell “keys” used for
downloading video games on platforms such as Steam,115 an online
video game store where users can also play with other gamers, and even
create their own games. Gray market resellers typically resell keys sent
promotionally (for example, to “influencers” in hopes of social media
promotion), or purchased from regions where the game is sold
cheaper.116
One of the most notorious gray market resellers is a company called
G2A. G2A calls itself “the world’s largest marketplace for digital
products.”117 Video game developers call them a pain in the neck. In
addition to not making any money on the resale of game keys,
developers say that fake and broken keys cost them tons of money in
customer service efforts — so much so, that they’ve begun encouraging
prospective reseller clients to pirate their games instead. Rami Ismail,
co-founder of independent game developer Vlambeer, recently urged,
“If you can’t afford or don’t want to buy our games full-price, please
pirate them rather than buying them from a key reseller. These sites cost

115 Store, STEAM, https://store.steampowered.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/LH2R-DCER].
116 See, e.g., Wes Fenlon & Tyler Wilde, PC Game Storefronts Compared: What You
Need to Know About Retailers and Resellers, PC GAMER (July 12, 2019),
https://www.pcgamer.com/pc-game-storefronts-compared-what-you-need-to-knowabout-retailers-and-resellers/ [https://perma.cc/AA4N-C2V2] (describing various
methods of obtaining keys).
117 Marketplace, G2A, https://www.g2a.co/what-is-g2a/marketplace/ (last visited Jan.
10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5VAT-SEDF].
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us so much potential dev time in customer service, investigating fake
key requests, figuring out credit card chargebacks, and more:”118

Ismail is far from the only game developer to express this sentiment.
Joining him in encouraging infringement of their copyrighted games are
the likes of Mike Rose, founder of game developer No More Robots,
who similarly pleaded, “Please, if you’re going to buy a game from G2A,
just pirate it instead! Genuinely! Devs don’t see a penny either way, so
we’d much rather G2A didn’t see money either.”119 Game developer
Squid Games has likewise stated, “Please torrent our games instead of
buying them on G2A.”120

118 Fraser Brown, Developers Tell People to Pirate Their Games Instead of Using G2A,
PC GAMER (July 1, 2019), https://www.pcgamer.com/developers-tell-people-to-piratetheir-games-instead-of-using-g2a/ [https://perma.cc/SE2Q-H6R7].
119 Id.
120 Id.

Monetizing Infringement

2020]

295

In other words, if they’re not going to see any money anyway, these
rightsholders would prefer to at least not incur additional customer
service expenses. The best way to minimize those expenses, they’ve
found, is to shut down the key resellers by encouraging prospective
secondary key buyers to simply infringe instead. After all, a consumer
who thinks they’ve purchased a legitimate game key is likely to feel
entitled to complain when something goes wrong. Pirates, on the other
hand, are notoriously low maintenance.
3.

Promotional Infringement

Finally, some private rightsholders utilize (actual and prospective)
infringement as a form of valuable promotional benefit. The subsections
that follow describe examples of what is herein called “promotional
infringement” in each of the music, film/television, and publishing
industries. Interestingly, this type of infringement is most likely to be
monetized by either rightsholders with few resources (such that they
cannot otherwise afford the marketing this promotion brings), or
rightsholders with abundant resources (but for whom this brand of
promotion is not something that can be bought).
a.

Music

Streaming services like YouTube and Vimeo are flooded with socalled “fan vids” — DIY music videos (of both the fair use and non-fair
use varieties) that sometimes surpass official videos in popularity. In
some cases, these videos are taken down by rightsholders. In other
cases, rightsholders allow, and sometimes even promote, these
infringing fan vids. When Polish film student Ivan Grbin made a fan vid
for Crystal Castles’ song “Plague” using footage from Andrzej
Zulawski’s 1981 psychological thriller Possession,121 the group’s
manager reached out to Grbin asking if he’d be willing to cut the footage
so they could use it as their official music video for the song. The artists
then posted the fan vid to their Facebook page, and sent the link to
121 Ivan Grbin, Crystal Castles “PLAGUE” Video, VIMEO (2014), https://vimeo.com/
89492388 [https://perma.cc/QPJ5-X8NZ].
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publicists. Ironically, a bot eventually took the video down for
copyright infringement. The artists have since reinstated it.122
Interestingly, director Andrzej Zulawski has been similarly copacetic
about the unlicensed use of his footage.123
Rapper Danny Brown had a similar reaction when Brooklyn-based
graphic designer Steven Menegozzi posted a video for Brown’s hit song
“Grown Up” using Fisher Price toy sets.124 According to Menegozzi,
“[b]efore I started making anything, I spent a lot of time blocking out
shots and relating them to the song’s lyrics. And since 3D takes so long,
I had a lot of time to improve and add things to the video. Danny Brown
actually tweeted the video. I’m glad he saw it and liked it.”125
Likewise, when two members of Chinese boy group WayV released a
choreographed video of recording artist Khalid’s track with Billie Eilish,
“lovely,” Khalid praised and retweeted it:

122 Luis Muñoz, Introducing the Amateur Director Behind Fan-Made Videos for Danny
Brown, Flying Lotus and More, FACT MAGAZINE (May 15, 2015), https://www.factmag.
com/2015/05/15/the-webs-best-fan-made-music-videos-flying-lotus-danny-brown-aphextwin/ [https://perma.cc/Z7EM-SXNU].
123 Id.
124 Steven Menegozzi, Danny Brown – Grown Up, VIMEO (2015), https://vimeo.com/
104376798 [https://perma.cc/2R62-QU2Y].
125 Muñoz, supra note 122.
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These fans used the music without a license, and posted it online
without permission.126 They credit Khalid and Eilish in the video’s title,
such that their infringement (if it is) is likely willful. Under extant
copyright law, Khalid and his label could have the video taken down,
and Ten and Winwin could be liable for up to $150,000 in statutory
damages.127 Instead, the artist gifted them nearly 100,000 likes and
50,000 retweets,128 inarguably encouraging their efforts, and those of
fans like them.
Why would a rightsholder not only refrain from enforcing their
statutory rights, but also potentially encourage further infringement in
this way? The answer is simple: free and effective promotion for the

126 The original post to YouTube may well have been covered by Content ID’s realtime license, but all subsequent downloads and reposts of the video to various platforms
and social media networks, group texts and subreddits, would not be.
127 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2018).
128 See WayV, [Rainbow V] TEN X WINWIN Choreography : Lovely (Billie Eilish,
Khalid) (Ring and Portrait Remix), YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=8ovHSQwp1n0 [https://perma.cc/QZM7-BK52].
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underlying work. Khalid and his label did not have to spend any money
making, producing, or editing the fan video. They pay nothing to
YouTube to host the video (and indeed, under Content ID, can even
collect advertising revenue from it). The video has over twelve million
views.129 While professionally produced music videos can cost
anywhere from hundreds of thousands to seven digits to produce, Ten
and Winwin’s video cost Khalid and his label nothing beyond foregoing
a potential maximum payout of only $150,000, less attorneys’ fees and
bad press for suing fans over an indisputably creative and successful
video.130
b.

Film & Television

In 2005, television studio Home Box Office (“HBO”) sought to fight
back against torrent sites by uploading en masse bogus and/or
malfunctioning files of its hit show Rome.131 Even a user with a
download client capable of detecting the junk files could be significantly
stalled — and often thwarted — in their attempt to illegally download
episodes of the show. In some cases, corrupt torrent files were known
to destroy a downloader’s hard drive; in other cases, the inability to tell
a good from a corrupt file resulted in a longer, more complicated searchand-download process. If nothing else, HBO’s “torrent poisoning” made
piracy of its show more onerous, and so less attractive.132
Seven years later, in 2012, HBO’s hit show Game of Thrones was
named the most pirated show of the year,133 with somewhere between
3.7 and 4.2 million torrents.134 On an investors’ call in 2013, Jeff
129

Id.
It’s worth noting that, despite the arguable cost savings and promotional
advantages accorded to both Khalid and his record label in this example, the label is
most likely the rightsholder, not Khalid (who most likely has assigned his rights to the
label under a recording contract). This is important because the interests of creators
and intermediary rightsholders can — and often do — diverge. In such a case, the
encouragement of infringement by a creator who is not a rightsholder might viewed as
a means for the artist to control downstream uses despite copyright law’s assumption
that rightsholders’ interests should dominate.
131 Nat
Torkington, HBO Attacking BitTorrent, RADAR (Oct. 4, 2005),
http://radar.oreilly.com/2005/10/hbo-attacking-bittorrent.html [https://perma.cc/UKE2FP2J].
132 See id.
133 Adi Robertson, High ‘Game of Thrones’ Piracy is ‘Better Than an Emmy,’ Says Time
Warner CEO, VERGE (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:44 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/
2013/8/8/4602764/game-of-thrones-piracy-better-than-an-emmy-says-time-warner-ceo
[https://perma.cc/C6T4-73HY].
134 Ernesto Van der Sar, Game of Thrones Most Pirated TV-Show of 2012, TORRENT
FREAK (Dec. 23, 2012), https://torrentfreak.com/game-of-thrones-most-pirated-tv130
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Bewkes, then-CEO of HBO’s parent company Time Warner, bragged
about the show’s illegal downloads: “If you go around the world, I think
you’re right, that ‘Game of Thrones’ is the most pirated show in the
world. . . . Now that’s better than an Emmy.”135 Why the change of
heart? According to Bewkes, much of the show’s popularity is owed to
immense Internet buzz, something that illegal downloads are very good
at generating.136
HBO isn’t the only Hollywood player to embrace infringement. The
sudden and complete shutdown of Megaupload — the hugely popular,
global torrent site — by the U.S. Justice Department in 2012137 offers a
neat natural experiment for observing the effects, both good and bad, of
mass infringement. Many content owners were quick to highlight the
increased traffic enjoyed by legal download sites following the
shutdown.138 But there was another, unexpected and remarkable effect
that has received far less attention: worldwide box office receipts for
medium-budget films went down, suggesting that for films without a
huge marketing budget, “file sharing might be the most economical
method of advertising and market research available.”139 After all, “[t]he
word-of-mouth effect that particularly helps a smaller-budget film can’t
begin until someone sees it, and that often happens through an
illegitimate download from a ‘torrent’ site.”140
Despite being the most frequently and widely discussed, torrenting is
far from the only form of infringement facing film and television
owners. At least as common is the practice of sharing subscriber logins
show-of-2012-121223/ [https://perma.cc/R99P-G7BB]; Ernesto Van der Sar, Game of
Thrones Crowned Most Pirated TV-Show of the Season, TORRENT FREAK (June 8, 2012),
https://torrentfreak.com/game-of-thrones-most-pirated-tv-show-of-the-season-120608/
[https://perma.cc/K5NR-G6ZR].
135 Caitlin Dewey, ‘Game of Thrones’ Exec Says Piracy is ‘Better Than an Emmy.’ He
Has a Point, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2013, 8:54 AM PDT), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/08/09/game-of-thrones-exec-says-piracy-is-better-thanan-emmy-he-has-a-point/ [https://perma.cc/JQ7X-S4N5].
136 See id.
137 See, e.g., Eriq Gardner, U.S. Authorities Shut Down Megaupload for Piracy,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 19, 2012, 2:49 PM PT), https://www.hollywoodreporter.
com/thr-esq/megaupload-shut-down-piracy-283397 [https://perma.cc/B6YG-KT6Z].
138 See, e.g., Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Gone in 60 Seconds: The Impact of the
Megaupload Shutdown on Movie Sales, 33 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 1, 1 (2014) (“[T]he
shutdown of Megaupload and its associated sites caused digital revenues for three major
motion picture studios to increase by 6.5–8.5%.”).
139 Jake Rossen, How Hollywood Can Capitalize on Piracy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 17,
2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520336/how-hollywood-can-capitalizeon-piracy/ [https://perma.cc/7MXK-3RR9].
140 Id.
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in contravention of subscription terms. For example, HBO’s streaming
service, HBO NOW, allows different people in the same household to
log on simultaneously to watch different programming.141 Ostensibly,
this might allow Mom to watch the news upstairs, Dad to watch a
thriller in the basement, and little Sue to watch Sesame Street in the
living room, all at the same time. In the real world, subscribers
frequently share logins with friends outside of their immediate
families/physical households. The practice appears to be a well-known
secret:

Even if we argue that the subscriber sharing their password is not
infringing, but rather breaching their contract with the platform, the
non-subscribing user of the password is inarguably infringing as they
lack any license with the platform to be breached. If HBO and Netflix
wanted to stop this infringement, they could restrict accounts to a single
IP address, but they don’t. Why not? Because “[p]eople sharing [cable
TV] subscriptions, running wires down the backs of apartment
buildings. Our experience is that it leads to more paying subscribers.”142
And when reports surface that platforms are going to begin “cracking
down,” spokespersons are quick to point out that the companies are
141 Help Center, HBO NOW, http://help.hbonow.com/Answer/Detail/27 (last visited
Jan. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7D8A-2G8L] (“[I]n most cases, members of your
household can sign in to HBO NOW on different devices, and watch different shows at
the same time. Your HBO NOW email and password should not be shared with anyone
outside your household. For security reasons, the number of simultaneous streams is
limited.”).
142 Rossen, supra note 139.
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“‘not involved in any enforcement relating to casual password sharing
among friends and relatives’ . . . [but instead are focused] on ‘theft of
creative works on a massive scale,’ mostly [by] those who operate piracy
sites or apps.”143 Again, the idea is that a potential customer has to try
a service out in order to get hooked and, hopefully, converted to a paid
subscription.
Another example of monetizing infringement in the film and
television context bears mention, as it forms the basis for how most such
content is consumed today. In 2018, Netflix produced and released
eighty films. That is two films per week, in addition to 700 original
television series.144 By way of comparison, in the same year, two of the
world’s largest movie studios, Disney and Warner Bros., released twelve
and twenty films, respectively.145 NBC launched thirteen new television
series, five of which were canceled.146
In addition to original programming, Netflix also attracts viewers by
purchasing rights to shows that it believes will be popular with its
subscribers. And how do they decide which shows to buy? According
to Netflix VP of Content Acquisition, Kelly Merryman, “we look at what
does well on piracy sites.”147 It follows, then, that creators of shows
want their pirate numbers to be high when Netflix goes poking around,
in hopes that they will get picked up by the country’s largest
subscription streaming service.148 In exchange, Netflix suggests that
once it enters a market, piracy decreases: “Netflix is so much easier than
143 Antonio Villas-Boas, Big Streaming Companies like Netflix and HBO Are Looking to
Crack Down on Freeloaders Who Use Other People’s Passwords and Accounts, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Nov. 11, 2019, 8:19 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-hbostreaming-companies-look-to-prevent-account-password-sharing-2019-11 [https://perma.
cc/9HMM-8X4D]. Even the title of this article is misleading, as the text itself makes
clear.
144 Todd Spangler, Netflix Eyeing Total of About 700 Original Series in 2018, VARIETY
(Feb. 27, 2018, 10:48 AM PT), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/netflix-700original-series-2018-1202711940/ [https://perma.cc/DC7Y-TZ47].
145 Graeme Virtue, Bigger Than the Big Screen: Can Netflix Conquer Cinema?,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2017, 6:00 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/film/
filmblog/2017/dec/20/netflix-streaming-films-cinema-hollywood-bright-will-smith
[https://perma.cc/8MKH-44YL].
146 See Jason Dietz, 2018–19 TV Season Scorecard, METACRITIC (June 1, 2018),
https://www.metacritic.com/feature/tv-renewal-scorecard-2018-2019-season [https://perma.
cc/VG7B-7RD7].
147 Todd Spangler, How Netflix Uses Piracy to Pick Its Programming, VARIETY (Sept.
14, 2013, 9:54 AM PT), https://variety.com/2013/digital/news/how-netflix-uses-piracyto-pick-its-programming-1200611539/ [https://perma.cc/C8UR-WCM6].
148 As of 2018, Netflix held a 51% market share. See Mansoor Iqbal, Netflix Revenue
and Usage Statistics, BUSINESS APPS (June 23, 2020), https://www.businessofapps.
com/data/netflix-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/FQQ7-ZC6Y].
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torrenting. You don’t have to deal with files, you don’t have to download
them and move them around. You just click and watch.”149 When
Netflix first entered Canada, for example, BitTorrent traffic dropped
50%.150 Even with this information, some shows, like Showtime’s
Dexter, refuse to license to Netflix at any price. This is because they are
interested in driving demand and increasing subscriber rates — in this
example, for Showtime’s proprietary streaming service — not in curbing
infringement.151
c.

Publishing

E-book marketplaces like Amazon have taken a similar “let-theminfringe-and-they-will-come” approach. As with music, many e-book
sellers have dropped, or effectively dropped, digital rights management
(“DRM”) as an anti-piracy tool, purportedly because they’d rather get
the books out there than not. After all, word-of-mouth leads to sales.
According to publisher Tim O’Reilly, “Amazon is effectively doing that
[ignoring their own DRM restrictions] now with the Kindle. They’re not
counting. I’ve switched between three different Android phones. I’m on
my second Kindle, my second iPad. I have ten devices registered. It
would be trivial for me to give my Kindle account credentials to other
people in my family or good friends and have everything I buy on Kindle
sent to one of them. . . . If people wanted 10,000 pirated copies of a
book, the publisher and the author would be very, very well off. If
10,000 people are willing to pirate it, there’s a very large number willing
to pay for it.”152 Again, even if we argue that an individual privately
copying an e-book from one of their devices onto another of their
devices is either a breach of contract,153 or permitted under Sony v.

149 Ernesto Van der Sar, Netflix Uses Pirate Sites to Determine What Shows to Buy,
TORRENT FREAK (Sept. 14, 2013), https://torrentfreak.com/netflix-uses-pirate-sites-todetermine-what-shows-to-buy-130914/ [https://perma.cc/W6GS-LVAB].
150 Id.
151 See Michael Liedtke, Gaps in Netflix Streaming Service Options Likely to Persist,
MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 9, 2012, 7:13 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2012/04/09/
gaps-in-netflix-streaming-service-options-likely-to-persist/ [https://perma.cc/GA38-GSES].
152 Jon Bruner, Tim O’Reilly on Piracy, Tinkering, and the Future of the Book, FORBES
(Mar. 25, 2011, 11:30 AM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonbruner/2011/03/25/
tim-oreilly-on-piracy-tinkering-and-the-future-of-the-book/#1d3e277c3b33 [https://perma.
cc/QP49-WT85].
153 Indeed, many of these platforms’ contracts do not convey actual ownership to the
“purchaser” of the content, but rather merely convey a license. See AARON PERZANOWSKI
& JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
2 (MIT Press 2016).
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Universal,154 the same cannot be said of an individual privately copying
an e-book from one of their devices onto the device of a friend or coworker.
As journalist and author Cory Doctorow puts it: “it’s hard to turn
fame into money in the arts, [but] it’s impossible to turn obscurity into
money in the arts . . . It doesn’t matter how you plan on making your
money . . . you won’t get the chance unless people have heard of your
stuff.”155 Infringement, it turns out, is a powerful promotional tool. In
other words, infringement can be monetized, a possibility that is not
recognized under the current statute.
II.

THE CASE FOR INFRINGEMENT IN COPYRIGHT

Part I described a series of examples in which rightsholders monetize
infringement of their copyrighted works. In so doing, these
rightsholders forego the possibility of equitable and/or monetary
remedies that might be earned through an infringement suit. This Part
considers several reasons why rightsholders might act in a manner that
appears, at least by the conventional statutory account, to run counter
to their best interests.
A. Statutory Fit and Price Discrimination
One explanation for the monetization of infringement might have to
do with the nature of copyright law itself. As is characteristic of
statutory licenses generally, copyright’s compulsory licenses are onesize-fits-all. This means they are only differentiated, when at all, by
licensee type,156 but not by market valuation (as held by user, or by
product/platform) — i.e., product differentiation — nor by nature or
type of use — price differentiation. For example, Amazon Music pays
the same streaming rate under Section 115 as Spotify does, despite the
fact that Spotify relies entirely upon music streaming as its business
model, while Amazon uses its music service primarily as a loss leader to

154 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984) (holding non-commercial uses of copyrighted works to a higher standard of
harm in order to show infringement).
155 Cory Doctorow, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Piracy, DRM, and the E-book
Issue, SIMON FRASER UNIV. PUB. (Jan. 18, 2013), https://publishing.sfu.ca/2013/01/thegood-the-bad-and-the-ugly-piracy-drm-and-the-e-book-issue/ [https://perma.cc/9SGSN5PV].
156 For example, Section 114 differentiates between interactive and noninteractive
services. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
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sell Amazon Prime memberships.157 Likewise, Spotify pays the same
royalty to a composer when a song is streamed by a paying user as it
does when a song is streamed by a “freemium” (or, ad-sponsored)
user.158
The lack of both price and product differentiation under a statutory
license can lead to pricing that neither reflects, nor responds to, the
market or consumer preferences. As a result, some consumers might be
willing to pay more, or could negotiate to pay less, for a particular piece,
or use, of content. This inefficiency may reduce incentives for the
creation and production of content that satisfies consumer demand.159
For example, the developers monetizing piracy of their video games by
selling pirates DLC have (at least) two price tiers: one for full-paying
customers (who buy both the game and the DLC) and one for pirates
(who don’t buy the game, but do buy the DLC). Notably, these
developers would prefer a user pirate a game than buy it new.160 To
understand why, consider a user with an endowment of $100 to spend
on video games: They can buy a used game for $30 (money the
developer never sees), leaving them $70 to spend on DLC (money that
goes to the developer). Alternately, they can pirate the game for $0,
leaving them $100 to spend on the DLC (money that goes to the
developer). In this way, piracy (and its subsequent monetization) of
their games is better business for the developer. It may also lead to
higher overall utility for the user, who gets to play more levels, buy
more lives, etc.161 Likewise, Netflix has two types of customers: paying
and soon-to-be-paying. The former pays more than the latter, of course,
but this needn’t always be the case. With plans to continue releasing
original content, Netflix allows password-sharing as part of its plan to
monetize that infringement.162
157 See id. § 115. The measure of intensity, or import, of use is often referred to as
“percent of revenue” in industry parlance.
158 See id.
159 For more on the impact of price and product differentiation (and the lack thereof)
on content and markets, see García, Penalty Default, supra note 17, at 1142-45.
160 See, e.g., Jon Devine, Pre-Owned Games Are Costing the Industry More Than Piracy,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 29, 2012, 10:54 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/preowned-games-are-costing-the-industry-more-than-piracy-2012-6 [https://perma.cc/SZ4C87CQ] (“Developers, such as Lionhead, have been claiming that second hand sales have
actually cost them more than piracy.”).
161 Indeed, some game franchises — including the very successful Fortnite — don’t
sell the game at all. Instead, they rely entirely on the DLC model described, and
eliminate “used competition” by eliminating used copies altogether.
162 See Jessica Bursztynsky, Netflix Price Hike May Spur Growth in Illegal Password
Sharing, CNBC (Jan. 31, 2019, 8:30 AM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/30/
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In their work on government waiver of statutory requirements, David
Barron and Todd Rakoff suggest that an increase in professional
lobbying has, in some cases, led to oddly specific and narrow statutes:
“It is [ ] neither new nor news that even general federal statutes have
often contained particularistic provisions that seem, in terms of scale,
out of place. These have often been explained as the results of a yielding
by Congress to special interests whose cases have been pushed by
particular legislators. We suspect . . . that the increased specificity of
many modern statutes can be in part explained in the same way.”163
Unfortunately, the narrower and more specific a statute is, the less
likely it is to apply evenly and well to differently situated parties.
Writing about the drafting of the current Copyright Act, Jessica Litman
notes that “most of the statutory language [of the 1976 Copyright Act]
was not drafted by members of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead,
the language evolved through a process of negotiation among authors,
publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property
rights the statute defines. In some cases, affected parties agreed upon
language, which was then adopted by Congress, while disagreeing about
what the language meant.”164 In other work, she describes “the political
power of copyright lobbies, aided by members of Congress eager to be
glamoured by famous entertainers and willing to be persuaded that the
only fundamental problem with the United States economy is
widespread piracy of American creations,”165 as leading to legislative
capture.
For example, after the passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act,
which extended copyright’s term by twenty years, Herbert Hovenkamp
suggested that:
[I]t is hard to come up with any serious argument that
retroactive extensions of old copyrights serve the constitutional
purpose of promoting the progress of the useful arts. Those
inventions and ideas have already been created. The Copyright
Term Extension Act shows us Congress at its worst, passing

netflix-price-hike-may-spur-growth-in-illegal-password-sharing.html [https://perma.
cc/V3SP-TFE4] (“[A]s content producers . . . companies benefit from maximum
consumer awareness of (and demand for) their original programming . . . Those original
programs are what is driving uptake of consumer subscriptions.”).
163 David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
265, 304-05 (2013) (citations omitted).
164 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 860-61 (1987) [hereinafter Compromise].
165 Jessica D. Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 39 (2010).
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legislation at the behest of power interest groups at society’s
expense.166
William Patry, former counsel to the Subcommittee on Intellectual
Property, described his congressional experience similarly:
Copyright interest groups hold fundraisers for members of
Congress, write campaign songs, invite members of Congress
(and their staff) to private movie screenings or sold-out
concerts, and draft legislation they expect Congress to pass
without any changes. In the 104th Congress, they are drafting
the committee reports and haggling among themselves about
what needs to be in the report. In my experience, some
copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually resent members of
Congress and staff interfering with what they view as their
legislation and their committee report. With the 104th
Congress we have, I believe, reached a point where legislative
history must be ignored because not even the hands of
congressional staff have touched committee reports.167
The degree of specificity resulting from a heavily lobbied process can
lead to a body of law — like copyright — that is ripe for defection by
those unable to participate in the legislative process (i.e., consumers
and independent creators). In his work on user-generated content, Ed
Lee describes the resulting informal copyright practices as gap fillers:
“While formal licenses allow the parties themselves to fill the gaps left
open by formal copyright law by private ordering, often the transaction
costs associated with formal licenses are far too high for any negotiation
to occur[.]”168 This defection, en masse and over time, has led even wellconnected industry interests to respond in kind. After all, copyright law
affords certain rights, but it does not guarantee income from those
rights.
B. Preference Endogeneity
Defection from a regime of statutory protection — in this case,
protection against copyright infringement — suggests a divergence in
either ideology or goals on the part of the protected parties — in this
166 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 250
(Harvard Univ. Press 2008).
167 William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996).
168 Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459,
1460-61 (2008).
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case, rightsholders. The same homogenous perspective adopted by
copyright’s statutory licenses is reflected in copyright policy’s
assumption of uniform, exogenous preferences on the part of
rightsholders; namely, the assumption that all rightsholders view
unauthorized copying as bad, and so don’t want to be infringed.
As the case studies in Part I.B supra showed, however, rightsholders’
preferences around infringement are actually both heterogeneous and
endogenous: Universal Music sought to take down user Lenz’s allegedly
unauthorized YouTube video, while Warp Records promoted a user’s
unauthorized fan vid.169 In some cases, a rightsholder’s private
preference may fluctuate over time: Electronic Arts spent many years
and lots of money fighting game pirates before eventually flipping to a
DLC business model that embraces infringement of their games.170
Rightsholder preferences may even change from copyrighted work to
copyrighted work. HBO flooded torrent sites with corrupted copies of
Rome, but bragged to stockholders about Game of Thrones’ popularity
on those same sites.171
Reliance on a standard of uniform, exogenous preferences results in
a statutory regime ill-suited to parties who differ from the assumed
preference. I argue this is exactly what has happened in the copyright
context, and helps to explain not only monetized infringement, but
other tensions in copyright policy as well. For example, the first sale
doctrine in copyright assumes that consumers don’t want to be held to
paying the rights owner a royalty upon resale of a work, and so allows
a copyrighted work to be resold without permission or payment to the
rightsholder.172 New ventures like UppstArt, which track art upon
resale and automatically kick a royalty back to the rights owner,
challenge this notion as they continue to attract buyers who like the
idea of supporting art and artists.173
Similarly, Section 115174 — the section of the statute that requires
terrestrial radio stations to pay a royalty to songwriters, but not to
owners of sound recordings — purports to understand that owners of
sound recordings view radio play as valuable promotion such that no
169

See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1.b.
171 See supra Part I.B.3.b.
172 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
173 UPPSTART, https://uppstart.io/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
HUD8-8ZD5]. For more on the potential impact of UppstArt’s business model and its
interaction with statutory law, see Kristelia A. García, Technological Rights Accretion, 36
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (2018).
174 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2018).
170
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payment is required, or perhaps that these owners will “make up the
difference” with higher royalties on the digital streaming side.175 Private
deals like the one entered into between Clear Channel Media and Big
Machine Records, in which the media conglomerate agrees to pay the
record label a terrestrial performance royalty anytime it plays a Taylor
Swift song, challenge this notion.176 So too do recent proposals like the
Ask Musicians For Music (“AM-FM”) Act, which proposes a terrestrial
performance right for sound recordings, and which has the backing of
powerful rightsholders groups like the Recording Industry Association
of America (“RIAA”) and the National Music Publishers Association
(“NMPA”).177
It’s worth noting, too, that in the same way enforcement can be
performative, so too can nonenforcement be.178 An artist, like Danny
Brown, who reaches out to compliment a fan on his DIY video, is

175 Statutory performance royalties are higher for sound recordings than for musical
compositions. For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon, see, for example, Kristelia A.
García, Facilitating Competition By Remedial Regulation, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 183,
201-02 (2016) (“A digital music service like Spotify currently pays $0.0052 per play to
SoundExchange for the public performance rights to a sound recording, while paying
only $0.00052 per play — or one tenth of the rate paid to SoundExchange — to ASCAP
for the same public performance rights to the underlying musical compositions. This
disparity reflects a determination by Congress that the nature of the industries for sound
recordings and musical compositions vary in material and substantial ways. For
example, the overhead required to commission and record an album has traditionally
outpaced the cost of signing a songwriter.
In a further effort to differentiate between the two rights, Congress included in the
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPSRA) a clause prohibiting the
rate court from taking sound recording license rates into account when setting the rates
for musical compositions. This congressional prohibition on the rate court, however,
did not keep the major publishers from taking note. At the Pandora-ASCAP proceeding,
Sony’s EVP of Business & Legal Affairs, Peter Brodsky, cited the ‘massive unfair
disparity’ between what Pandora pays for sound recordings and what it pays for musical
compositions as the principal reason for the company’s withdrawal from ASCAP: ‘It was
the “differential” between the rates paid to the labels and the publishers that was the
problem[.]’”) (citations omitted).
176 For more detail on this deal, see García, Penalty Default, supra note 17, at 1136-56.
177 Claudia Rosenbaum & Ed Christman, Congress Introduces AM-FM Act to Get
Artists & Labels Paid for Radio Play, BILLBOARD (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/legal-and-management/8544466/am-fmact-congress-artists-labels-paid-radio [https://perma.cc/ZR78-4DN8]. The bills’
backers, Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) Congressman Jerrold Nadler (D-NY),
previously supported the (ultimately unsuccessful) Fair Play for Fair Pay Act in both
2015 and 2017.
178 For more on how acts and words can be “performative,” see generally J.L. AUSTIN,
HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6-7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962), (explaining how words
are performative in that they perform a “speech act”).
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communicating that he values the fan (perhaps as much as he values
the promotion). A video game developer who tweets out a plea that
users pirate a game rather than buy a gray market key is communicating
a compromise, a prioritization of cost savings over expenditure
(especially since neither results in revenue). The failure to recognize
preference endogeneity can lead rightsholders to act incongruously to
statutory expectations, including by monetizing the very infringement
they are assumed to disfavor.
C. Changed Circumstances
The speed and frequency with which technological innovations
impact the distribution and consumption of copyrighted works make it
very difficult for copyright law to keep up. Section 114’s179 rate-setting
procedure is a good example of the intractability of the process. Under
Section 804(b), rate-setting under Section 114 entails an extensive
notice-and-comment period causing the process to begin two years
prior to implementation.180 Such timing makes it difficult, when not
impossible, for the statute to respond efficiently to changes in the
market. Indeed, the current Copyright Act was just over twenty years in
the making, including countless negotiations between industry
representatives, “repeated, lengthy subcommittee hearings,”
“numerous executive sessions,” and “a flood of committee reports.”181
Technology isn’t the only variable affecting copyright’s ability to stay
current. Ever-evolving business models (sometimes in response to
technological change, sometimes not) are also a factor. The evolution
of digital business models, for example, has had a profound impact on
who and what the law is supposed to be acting upon. In the case of
digital music, the shift from a business model focused on selling a
product — namely, digital downloads (e.g., Apple’s iTunes music
service) — to selling a service — namely, curated streaming (e.g.,
Spotify) — took place over a remarkably short period of time,182 and

179

17 U.S.C. § 114 (2018).
See id. § 804(b) (detailing how and when royalty rates are set).
181 Litman, Compromise, supra note 164, at 871.
182 Apple’s iTunes launched in 2001. See, e.g., Kirk McElhearn, 15 Years of iTunes: A
Look at Apple’s Media App and its Influence on an Industry, MACWORLD (Jan. 9, 2016, 3:00
AM PST), https://www.macworld.com/article/3019878/15-years-of-itunes-a-look-atapples-media-app-and-its-influence-on-an-industry.html [https://perma.cc/43AL-7H76].
A mere seven years later, in 2008, Spotify launched in Sweden. Company Info, SPOTIFY,
https://newsroom.spotify.com/company-info/ (last visited Jul. 7, 2020) [https://perma.
cc/78XL-6DHD].
180
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enjoys a remarkably large share of the music-consuming market.183 The
same shift can be seen in the film and television industries — in which
the focus moved from selling DVDs to selling streaming subscriptions
(to Hulu, to Netflix, to HBOGo, to Disney+, etc.) — and in video games
— in which many developers are no longer selling physical or digital
games, but instead are selling a storefront of in-game purchases.184
Changes in, or clarification of, copyright law is another explanation
for changes in rightsholders’ attitude toward prospective infringement.
This is especially true for uses that might qualify as fair uses. A possible
explanation, then, for Warp’s differential treatment of the Aphex Twin
fan video is that Warp’s counsel read the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision
in Lenz v. Universal, which held that the Section 512 Safe Harbor
“requires copyright holders to consider whether the potentially
infringing material is a fair use of a copyright under 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 before issuing a takedown notification.”185
In all of these instances, the rightsholders are no longer conferring
ownership over a piece of content, but rather a license to access that
content. Unlike the sale of a single CD, or a single MP3, the sale of a
streaming subscription is a revenue source that keeps on giving. It also
largely obviates the practical import (and consumer protections) of the
first sale doctrine, as exemplified by the recent ReDigi litigation, in
which the rightsholder argued, among other things, that the first sale
doctrine didn’t apply to MP3s, but only to physical goods.186
Unfortunately, the law is not the only Johnny-come-lately in this
scenario. Consumers have also occasionally found themselves illinformed regarding the ramifications of the replacement of physical (or
183 According to the RIAA’s Mid-Year 2019 Revenue Report, streaming revenues
made up 80% of total revenues from recorded music. RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N AM., MIDYEAR 2019 RIAA MUSIC REVENUES REPORT (2019), https://www.riaa.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/Mid-Year-2019-RIAA-Music-Revenues-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BJ5P-LLQV].
184 See Kuchera, supra note 105.
185 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016).
186 While the district court agreed, the Second Circuit punted on this issue, finding
“[t]he district court found that resales through ReDigi were infringing for two reasons.
The first reason was that, in the course of ReDigi’s transfer, the phonorecord has been
reproduced in a manner that violates the Plaintiffs’ exclusive control of reproduction
under § 106(1); the second was that the digital files sold through ReDigi, being unlawful
reproductions, are not subject to the resale right established by § 109(a), which applies
solely to a ‘particular . . . phonorecord . . . lawfully made.’ 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). We agree
with the first reason underlying the district court’s finding of infringement. As that is a
sufficient reason for affirmance of the judgment, we make no ruling on the district
court’s second reason.” Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 656 (2d Cir.
2018).
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digital) sales with a licensing business model. The controversy over
Amazon’s and Apple’s use of “Buy Now” buttons (when in fact, nothing
but temporary file access is being sold) is another example of this
mismatch.187
The inability of copyright law to respond in real time to changes in
technology and consumer preferences can lead to a situation in which
some rightsholders can do better by rejecting certain statutory
protections, such as that against infringement. In short, “[a]n
intellectual property owner can use a myriad of alternative business
models to extract value from the free distribution of intellectual
property.”188
D. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Ultimately, a rightsholder’s decision whether or not to pursue a claim
for copyright infringement is a cost-benefit analysis. Systems that
monitor for possible copyright infringement are expensive; YouTube’s
Content ID system, for example, cost over $100 million to develop189
— a reasonable sum for YouTube, perhaps, but not for a fledgling startup. The fact that YouTube nonetheless proceeded with the design and
build out of a system to replace Section 512’s transaction cost savings
points unequivocally to an analysis in which the benefit (in this case, of
prospectively infringing — and popular — videos around which
advertising can be served) outweighs the cost.190
Litigation is also expensive. Given the subjectivity of the fair use
standard, suing for copyright infringement can be particularly uncertain

187 See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We Buy
Now, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 317 (2017) (presenting the “results of the first study of the
impact of marketing language like the Buy Now button on the beliefs and behavior of
digital media consumers”).
188 Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why
Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 24
(1997).
189 Paul Sawers, YouTube: We’ve Invested $100 Million in Content ID and Paid over $3
Billion to Rightsholders, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 7, 2018, 3:48 AM), https://venturebeat.
com/2018/11/07/youtube-weve-invested-100-million-in-content-id-and-paid-over-3billion-to-rightsholders/ [https://perma.cc/27CY-BV3C].
190 Justin Hughes has suggested an alternative interpretation for the development of
Content ID: targeted advertising. As summarized in Sag, Safe Harbors, supra note 93, at
541: “Targeted advertising is based on a variety of user characteristics, but to the extent
that YouTube based its targeting on who watches what, it would be hard to then
disclaim knowledge of the same.”
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and unpredictable.191 Some rightsholders refrain from seeking relief for
copyright infringement in a court of law, and instead may resort to
various (and often successful) self-help tactics that cost less and
promise a more reliable result.192 Or, as with the case studies in Part I
supra, may elect to refrain from enforcement altogether.193
In addition, and depending on the defendant, the ultimate payoff (if
successful) may not really pay off. In the 2008 copyright infringement
suit brought by the RIAA against file-sharer Jammie Thomas, for
191 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.1, at 12:3 (3d ed. 2005)
(“[N]o copyright doctrine is less determinate than fair use.”); Michael W. Carroll,
Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1095 (2007) (noting that “the fair use doctrine
produces significant ex ante uncertainty”); Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 574-78 (2008) (proposing that fair use’s multifactor test
makes it “notoriously difficult” to accurately predict the outcomes of an infringement
suit). But see Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 79-85 (2012)
(challenging the conventional view that “fair use adjudication is blighted by
unpredictability and doctrinal incoherence”); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair
Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2570 (2009) (suggesting that when users are “careful
about how much they take from copyrighted works in relation to their purpose . . .
productive uses are likely to be fair”). Notwithstanding these findings to the contrary,
the popular notion of risk and the norm of risk-avoidance are still prominent. See, e.g.,
Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter, Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use and Fair
Licensing, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 53, 69-71 (2014) (determining that the risk of very high
statutory damages in copyright reinforces a norm of “if in doubt, leave it out”). In a new
project, Justin Hughes proposes an alternate explanation for why some commentators
can’t agree as to fair use’s predictability; namely: “When commentators talk about fair
use being ‘stable [and] predictable,’ they are thinking of the fact patterns that are now
handled under de facto rules already generated off §107; in those cases, the prior
decisions are actually more important than the statutory fair use factors. When
commentators speak of fair use being an unpredictable crap shoot, they are thinking of
new fact patterns that have not yet been subsumed under a de facto rule and thereby
require direct application of the §107 fair use standard.” Justin Hughes, The Sub Rosa
Rules of Copyright Fair Use, 34 HARVARD J.L. TECH (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5).
192 See Amy Adler & Jeanne C. Fromer, Taking Intellectual Property into Their Own
Hands, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1455, 1458-59 (2019) (describing how various rightsholders
use self-help techniques to achieve most of the benefits they might through litigation,
but at lower cost and with more certain outcome).
193 The newly-proposed copyright small claims act, if ultimately signed into law,
might reduce this cost, for better or for worse. The Copyright in Small-Claims
Enforcement Act of 2019 (“CASE Act”), S.1273 (2019). For more on the potential
benefits and drawbacks of a copyright small claims court, see, for example, Pamela
Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About a Proposed Copyright Small
Claims Tribunal, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 689 (2018) (outlining scholarly concerns with
the proposed implementation of a small claims procedure for copyright). Cf. Kevin
Madigan, CASE Act Set to Empower Creators and Impose Accountability, CTR. FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2018/04/02/case-actset-to-empower-creators-and-impose-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/2BQQ-395X]
(arguing in favor of the CASE Act’s implementation).
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example, an initial verdict of $1.92 million in favor of plaintiffs was
eventually reduced to $222,000, and affirmed by the Eight Circuit.194
This was after defendant Thomas rejected the RIAA’s settlement offer of
$25,000.195 As of this writing, the RIAA has received no payment from
Ms. Thomas, who has publicly stated: “As I’ve said from the beginning,
I do not have now, nor do I anticipate in the future, having $220,000 to
pay this . . . If they do decide to try and collect, I will file for bankruptcy
as I have no other option . . . it is what it is.”196
When faced with these prospective costs, and relatively small upside,
the benefits of monetizing infringement — be it in the form of revenue,
cost savings, or valuable promotion — may win out for some
rightsholders.
E. Enforcement Authority
Of the three branches of intellectual property — patent, trademark,
and copyright — copyright is the only one that affords a rightsholder
protection in the absence of any affirmative act requesting or confirming
that such protection is desired. Unlike a patent, which must be applied
for and granted,197 the mere fixation of an expression in a tangible
medium results in a copyright.198 Unlike trademark registration, which
requires use of the protected mark in commerce and renewal every ten
years,199 copyright law affords the same protection to both exploited and
unexploited works.200 Since 1989, when the United States signed onto
the Berne Convention, registration is not even required.201 As such, a
copyright that only the rightsholder knows about — but that anyone
could potentially infringe — is entirely (and inexplicably) possible.

194 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 910 (8th Cir. 2012)
(affirming reduced award); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1227 (D. Minn. 2008).
195 See David Kravets, Settlement Rejected in ‘Shocking’ RIAA File Sharing Verdict,
WIRED (Jan. 27, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/01/settlement-rejectedin-shocking-riaa-file-sharing-verdict/ [https://perma.cc/DG78-RX9H].
196 David Kravets, Supreme Court OKs $222K Verdict for Sharing 24 Songs, WIRED
(Mar. 18, 2013, 11:58 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/scotus-jammie-thomasrasset/ [https://perma.cc/8S27-UDX5].
197 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-157 (2018).
198 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
199 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2018).
200 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-104 (2018).
201 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
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As a form of property, copyright enjoys what Tim Wu has called an
“ex post notice right,” or an “opt-in right;” that is, “rights that require
action after trespass to create liability — absent complaint, there is no
wrong committed.”202 Ian Ayres has termed these kinds of rights “dualchooser” rights, since they require action by both parties (i.e., the
infringer must infringe, and the infringed must bring an action for
enforcement against the infringer).203 It is the enforcement authority
vested with the rightsholder — or, the “ex post notice” — that affords
copyright owners the unique opportunity to decline to enforce, and to
opt to monetize infringement instead. For example, in his work on
network effects in software, Ariel Katz has described the decision not to
protect software as a “conscious business profit-maximizing
strategy.”204
Importantly, the option to monetize infringement impacts, in some
cases at least, the analysis of secondary liability for copyright
infringement. Content ID is a good example of this dynamic: In utilizing
the ad revenue-claiming system, rightsholders effectively license in realtime what might otherwise qualify as infringement of their copyrighted
work, thereby excusing the intermediary — in this case, YouTube —
from secondary liability, and/or from implication as an inducer.
F.

Norm Heterogeneity

A final impetus for monetized infringement is at once obvious and
subtle: As a community, rightsholders do not have a consensus view
when it comes to infringement norms. In a forthcoming piece, Brian
Frye makes a similar observation with regard to plagiarism in academia:
Gradually, different social groups settled on different sets of
plagiarism norms. But the norms were always fluid, changing in
response to social and economic circumstances. For example,
journalistic plagiarism norms were quite minimal in the early
19th century, but became much more rigid as competition
increased in the late 19th century. Initially, copying was
encouraged. Newspapers mailed copies to each other, and
editors used scissors to compose newspapers under their own
byline. But later, as newspapers consolidated and information

202

Wu, supra note 24, at 6.
IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS Chs. 3-4 (Univ.
of Chi. Press 2005).
204 Ariel Katz, A Network Effects Perspective on Software Piracy, 55 U. TORONTO L.J.
155, 156 (2005).
203
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became more valuable, editors began to demand attribution and
object to copying.
Similarly, novelists and playwrights expected and demanded
more and broader protection as their works became increasingly
valuable. They wanted to prevent competition, by any means
necessary. Where unattributed copying had once been the
norm, plagiarism norms began to emerge.205
The evolving and variable norms that Frye describes in the plagiarism
context are observable in the copyright context as well. As a novel
threat, piracy was initially viewed as bad not only because it was illegal
(i.e., against copyright law), but because game developers, for example,
found themselves losing money and didn’t like it (i.e., found their norm
against unpaid use violated).206 Gradually, different game developers
settled on different sets of infringement norms, changing in response to
social and economic circumstances: Where an anti-piracy stance had
once been the norm, a pro-piracy stance began to emerge for some
vendors.207
The different perspectives pertaining to copying and use can also be
at least partially explained by generational shifts in norms around
unauthorized use. For artists and intermediaries who grew up in the age
of the Internet, some uses that were formerly disallowed may have come
to be accepted, or normalized, as part of the cultural expectation. This
is also true from the users’ perspective.
From the perspective of copyright’s policy goals, the rule against
infringement is explained as protecting authors’ incentives to create. But
recording artist Khalid has made clear he isn’t harmed by WayV’s fan
video.208 CEO Rami Ismail has made clear that game developer Vambeer
would rather consumers pirate their games than deal in gray market
keys.209 For these and similarly minded rightsholders, then, this
traditional justification is tenuous at best. Put simply, not all

205

Brian L. Frye, Plagiarize This Paper, 60 IDEA: IP L. REV. 294, 303 (2020).
Or at least, believed themselves to be losing money. There is a long-running
debate in the space as to whether those who pirate (a game, a film, a CD, etc.) would
otherwise become paying customers, or rather would simply be non-customers. The
most likely answer is, of course, “it depends,” but in any case, the translation is almost
certainly not one-to-one.
207 Although he would explicitly not require it, my browbeaten adherence to
academic norms of plagiarism obligate me to note that this sentence was intentionally
plagiarized/paraphrased from Frye’s work, supra note 205, at 303.
208 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a.
209 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
206

University of California, Davis

316

[Vol. 54:265

rightsholders are anti-infringement. Copyright law’s assumption that
they are can lead to a mismatch between rule and reality.
III. MONETIZING INFRINGEMENT AS PRIVATE POLICYMAKING
Having explained why rightsholders might opt to monetize, rather
than counter, infringement, this Part considers whether private
monetization of infringement is normatively desirable, and discusses
the implications of private policymaking through nonenforcement, a
counterintuitive — but not so unusual — phenomenon. The following
subparts consider the possible benefits and concerns stemming from
monetized infringement, as well as what role, if any, the government
plays or should play.
A. Prospective Benefits
A rightsholder’s decision to monetize infringement of their
copyrighted work is effectively a decision to opt out of copyright’s
statutory protection on a one-off basis — vis-à-vis a particular user, for
a particular use, at a particular time. This makes the monetization of
infringement a form of private ordering in which the parties substitute
a private preference for infringement over copyright’s preference against
it. As such, many of the benefits enjoyed by rightsholders who monetize
infringement of their works mirror those enjoyed by any party who opts
out of a statutory regime in favor of private ordering. As discussed in
the sections infra, these include improved efficiency and tailoring. For
its part, the government also benefits from better information-sharing.
1.

Efficiency

In an unfortunate twist, copyright infringement suits often pit artists
against their fans (who are sometimes artists themselves).210 While it
may be argued that with fans like that, rightsholders don’t need
enemies, the reality is that infringement is variable — in impetus, in
impact, in intent, and in effect. Nonetheless, copyright law doesn’t
differentiate beyond willful and non-willful infringement,211 a
distinction that is rarely determinative of whether a particular instance
210 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (involving an infringement claim brought by the author of Harry Potter, J.K.
Rowling, and her publishing company against a fan who created and published an
online encyclopedia for the series).
211 NB: Statutory damages are potentially higher for willful infringers. 17 U.S.C.
§ 504 (2018).
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of infringement is efficient. For example, the film student who made a
fan vid for Crystal Castles’ “Plague” did so willfully; it was his thesis
project.212 He also did so without pay. The video was very popular — as
of this writing, it has over 40,000 views.213 As a result, the rightsholders
received valuable promotion at no cost to them. In addition, they saved
whatever time and money they may have spent on an infringement suit
with an uncertain outcome.
To the extent music consumption is a repeat-player game, they also
avoided alienating a loyal fan, and so retained the possibility of future
earnings from that party. From a private efficiency perspective, it was
perfectly reasonable for Crystal Castles’ manager to reach out to the fan
— not to sue him, but to ask him to let them use his video
promotionally. Importantly, Crystal Castles might not make this same
decision in the case of, say, a lyric video (commonly understood as a
near-perfect substitute for paid streaming). There, it might make more
sense to sue for infringement, or, more likely, to issue a takedown notice
or to claim revenues against it. In this way, monetized infringement
functions as a means of differentiating value among different users and
different uses.
As with other forms of private ordering, monetized infringement may
also allow for greater overall efficiency since individual rightsholders
have better, more accurate information about their respective
tolerances, priorities, and resources than the legislature. As such,
rightsholders who opt not to enforce against potential infringers can
behave more nimbly and flexibly in the face of changing market
conditions, new business models, and idiosyncratic circumstances. We
might even view Congress’s delegation of enforcement authority to
private copyright holders as a de facto delegation of power to the party
with the most information, who is therefore presumed to be in the best
position to act efficiently. After all, private rightsholders have more
information about themselves than Congress does. Any attempt by
Congress to gather this information and act upon it is costly — far more
costly than simply leaving it to the relevant rightsholders.
As an added bonus, each time a rightsholder opts to forbear from
enforcement against — or even, as in these examples, to actively
monetize — infringement, it reduces litigation clutter, a common
problem in copyright.214 The propensity for litigation clutter in
copyright stems, in large part, from how terribly long infringement
212

See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a.
Grbin, supra note 121.
214 See, e.g., Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1873,
1929-30 (2018) (discussing the phenomenon in the fair use context).
213
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litigation takes. In order to sue for infringement, a rightsholder must
have a registered copyright.215 Since 1989, however, registration with
the copyright office is not required in order to obtain a copyright.216
Prior to 2018, there was a circuit split as to whether a rightsholder
necessarily had to have a registration in hand before filing an
infringement suit, or whether they could file for registration
simultaneously with filing suit.217 In Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp.
v. Wall-Street.com, the Supreme Court held that a rightsholder cannot
file an infringement suit until after their work has been registered with,
and approved by, the U.S. Copyright Office.218 Under current
conditions, this can take an average of three to nine months or more.219
Expedited registration shortens that to a few weeks, but currently costs
$800 (versus the standard registration fee of $35), 220 a sum not readily
available to all rightsholders. This cost and delay can be avoided, of
course, by simply not pursuing an infringement claim in the first place.
Finally, the ability of rightsholders to monetize certain forms of
infringement may ameliorate some of the concerns raised by copyright’s
lengthy term of protection. For example, some commentators have
lamented the lack of a supporting cost-benefit analysis.221 Others have

215

See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018).
See Berne Convention, supra note 201.
217 Compare Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d
1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding registration completed under 17 U.S.C. 411(a)
when the Register of Copyrights approves a claimant’s application), with Cosmetic Ideas,
Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding registration
completed under 17 U.S.C. 114(a) when the claimant’s “complete application” is
received by the Copyright Office).
218 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 888
(2019) (“The registration approach, we conclude, reflects the only satisfactory reading
of § 411(a)’s text. We therefore reject Fourth Estate’s application approach. . . . Under
§ 411(a), ‘registration . . . has been made,’ and a copyright owner may sue for
infringement, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright.”) (citations omitted).
219 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REGISTRATION PROCESSING TIMES 1, https://www.copyright.
gov/registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
FP5T-AQDP].
220 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE FEES 4, https://www.copyright.gov/
circs/circ04.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/P8EY-6YGV]. For
additional background and examples of the impact litigation delay can have, see, for
example, Scott Alan Burroughs, Copyright Litigation: Now More Expensive and with More
Delay Than Ever Before!, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 13, 2019, 11:14 AM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2019/03/copyright-litigation-now-more-expensive-and-withmore-delay-than-ever-before/?rf=1 [https://perma.cc/E6C7-PT7R].
221 See, e.g., Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 3, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846 (“Taken
216
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discussed the inefficiency borne of an overly long period of protection,
including the proliferation of market entry of questionable value.222 As
a form of one-off “licensing,” the monetization of infringement helps to
mitigate these concerns as rightsholders and prospective users move
toward a more efficient distribution.
2.

Tailoring

Under a statutory regime like copyright, licensees pay the same rate
for use of the same content, regardless of the (admittedly subjective)
quality of the particular content and the circumstances of its use. Under
Section 114, for example, a stream of Wu-Tang Clan’s C.R.E.A.M.223
earns the same royalty as a stream of Desiigner’s Panda.224 This heretical
outcome225 is the result of Section 114’s one-size-fits-all nature — one
ill-suited for many works and uses. The option to monetize
infringement, on the other hand, allows a rightsholder to tailor their
enforcement decision to a particular piece of content, to a particular
user, and/or to a particular use. This arguably leads to the production
and distribution of content deemed valuable by the market — such as
certain high promotional value fan vids — while continuing to curb the
production and distribution of content deemed undesirable by the
market — such as low-quality streaming-substitute lyric videos. As a
doctrine, copyright infringement fails to make this important
distinction; unauthorized use is unauthorized use regardless of value.
By allowing tailoring in accordance with benefit, monetizing
infringement improves upon the statutory option to sue.
Another potential benefit of tailoring is that it may allow for greater
use of content than would otherwise be permissible under the statutory
regime. Instead of only one official music video for Danny Brown’s
Grown Up, for example, YouTube currently hosts nine such videos (one

as a whole, it is highly unlikely that the economic benefits from copyright [term]
extension . . . outweigh the additional costs.”).
222 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A New Uneasy Case for Copyright, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1644, 1680 (2011) (“Though [even stronger copyright protection] would
maximize the production of works, rent dissipationtheory indicates that the marginal
works produced might be of little or negative social value . . . .”).
223 WU-TANG CLAN, C.R.E.A.M. (Loud Records 1993).
224 DESIIGNER, PANDA, (Menace 2015).
225 Unlike the inherent subjectivity involved in most judgments of musical quality,
this determination is ironclad, and the author will not accept opinions to the contrary
(also known as “wrong opinions”).
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official, and a variety of fan videos and remixes).226 To the extent
copyright is concerned with incentivizing creation, leaving the
enforcement decision to rightsholders who may opt instead to monetize
infringement is one way to accomplish that goal.227
3.

Information

In contract law, a penalty default is an unpalatable fallback option
that kicks in unless the parties to the contract negotiate otherwise.228
One of the advantages afforded by the existence of a penalty default is
that it can induce the parties — who are each most knowledgeable about
their respective situations, but generally (and certainly relatively)
ignorant as the counterparty’s — to “reveal information by contracting
around the default penalty.”229 For example, where a contractual default
leads to an undesirable result for Party A (possessor of information
unknown to Party B), Party A may be incentivized to negotiate around
the default, thereby revealing their (formerly private) information.
Importantly, Party A reveals this information not only to Party B, but
also to the government, which in turn can use that information to draft
not just better laws, but also to make better enforcement decisions.
Consider, for example, the case of the federal government’s shutdown
and seizure of the torrent site Megaupload. According to the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Megaupload boasted “more than one
billion visits to the site, more than 150 million registered users, 50
million daily visitors and account[ed] for four percent of the total traffic
on the Internet. The estimated harm caused by the conspiracy’s criminal
conduct to copyright holders is well in excess of $500 million. The
conspirators allegedly earned more than $175 million in illegal profits

226 Online search for YouTube Danny Brown’s Grown Up, www.google.com (Jan. 10,
2020).
227 This is not intended as a statement on the quality of the incentivized creation,
nor the desirability of more content over less. Some scholars have argued persuasively
that this follow-on creation may actually be inefficient insofar as we might encourage
creators to produce superfluous works very similar to existing works, where that effort
might be better invested elsewhere. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial
Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 33 (2004) (finding
that increasing copyrighted material does not necessarily create variety); Christopher S.
Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
635 (2007) (arguing less content shows consumer disinterest).
228 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
229 Id. at 94.
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through advertising revenue and selling premium memberships.”230
Using its authority under Section 506,231 the government seized the site,
and has been trying to get New Zealand to extradite its founders —
including principal Kim Dotcom — ever since.232 This decision was
made with the robust and unanimous support of such major content
representatives as the RIAA and the MPAA, each of whom also filed
separate civil lawsuits against the torrent site.233 The fact that small-and
medium-budget films sometimes encourage piracy of their films as a
form of marketing that they can’t otherwise afford,234 however, suggests
that not all rightsholders are the same. It is unclear whether possession
of this information on the infringement preferences of smaller budget
films would have changed the government’s position on Megaupload,
but it may have. For example, the DOJ might have decided to allow
impacted content owners to opt into (or out of) a settlement instead.
The music and publishing industries’ partial abandonment of DRM
for physical CDs and some e-books235 is another example of information
revealed by private non-enforcement of the right against infringement.
Section 512(i)(1)(B) conditions an intermediary’s protection from
secondary liability on its agreement not to interfere with “standard
technical measures,”236 defined in Section 512(i)(2) as
[T]echnical measures that are used by copyright owners to
identify or protect copyrighted works and (A) have been
developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners
and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry
standards process; (B) are available to any person on reasonable
230 Justice Department Charges Leaders with Widespread Online Copyright Infringement,
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentcharges-leaders-megaupload-widespread-online-copyright-infringement [https://perma.cc/
GA5S-KLVS]; see also Superseding Indictment of Megaupload at 2, United States v. Dotcom,
No. 1:12CR3, 2012 WL 4788433 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2012).
231 17 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C) (2018).
232 The latest appeal was filed by defendants in June 2019. See Nick Perry, Kim
Dotcom Fights US Extradition in New Zealand’s Top Court, AP NEWS (June 10, 2019),
https://apnews.com/e086e013950143dea8e0ed8e7b0f3b7d [https://perma.cc/FNN42FGC].
233 See, e.g., Stuart Dredge, Kim Dotcom and Megaupload Sued for Copyright
Infringement by Music Labels, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2014/apr/11/riaa-mpaa-megaupload-kim-dotcom-piracy-lawsuits
[https://perma.cc/TF69-RT26] (noting that the RIAA and MPAA filed lawsuits against
Megaupload).
234 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.b.
235 But not, notably, for streaming or digital book lending by libraries.
236 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2018).
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and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose
substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on
their systems or networks.237
While DVD DRM is technically the only system implemented
“pursuant to a broad consensus,” the DRM measures implemented on
other formats is often considered under this same standard. Record
labels began abandoning DRM in 2007.238 E-publishers and e-book
platforms, like Amazon’s Kindle, have followed suit, openly declining
to track how many devices a purchased e-book is transferred
between.239 To some extent, the move away from technical protection
measures is a reflection of changes in technology that have made these
systems increasingly easy to circumvent.240 This information might
allow lawmakers to update the legislative framework in light of
changing circumstances. In this example, legislators looking to improve
the efficiency of copyright law might remove the condition in 512(i),
thereby setting an assumption of no DRM as the default, and allowing
private parties to negotiate for such protections when and where they
find them useful.
B. Potential Concerns
The preceding subpart outlined some of the ways that infringement
can be better — for rightsholders, for users, for society, and for the
legislature — than non-infringement. Unfortunately, with these
benefits also comes various opportunities for gamesmanship, as this
subpart describes.

237

Id. § 512(i)(2).
Only to see their sales increase. See, e.g., Freek Vermeulen, How Removing Copy
Protection Increased Record Companies’ Music Sales, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014, 12:14 PM
EST), https://www.forbes.com/sites/freekvermeulen/2014/01/27/how-removing-copyprotection-increased-record-companies-music-sales/#741fa77e2ca5 [https://perma.cc/
TKL9-AG5W].
239 See Bruner, supra note 152.
240 In the Seventh Triennial Rulemaking on Exemptions Granted in Section 1201,
online video games were brought under the exemption for the first time, though more
narrowly than petitioners had hoped. This is because, interestingly, video game
developers argued DRM was still vital in that particular market. For a summary of the
arguments, see Keton Hansrajh, The Expanded DMCA Exemption for Video Game
Preservation Grants a Small Victory Amidst the Seventh Triennial Rulemaking, EFF (Nov.
26, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/11/expanded-dmca-exemption-videogame-preservation-grants-small-victory-amidst [https://perma.cc/9YPK-UNS3].
238
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Anticompetitiveness

As with other forms of private ordering, the option to monetize
infringement may favor larger, more powerful rightsholders and
platforms. As HBO’s highest-ever grossing franchise,241 HBO’s Game of
Thrones can afford to boast of being the “most torrented.”242 A fledgling
Netflix series that ends up canceled for lack of paying viewership,
however, cannot.
Moreover, because the enforcement decision is made on a one-off
basis, a rightsholder could use the option to favor certain infringers over
others, whether intentionally or unintentionally. For example, a fan
might see Khalid’s tweet praising and promoting WayV’s fan vid of
“lovely”243 and be induced to spend time and money producing their
own video for the track, only to find it taken down or blocked by the
record label.
If that result seems like a case of “ah, well, that’s the risk one takes,”
consider what happens when we move to a vertically integrated
example: Television streaming service Hulu is wholly owned by
Disney.244 Disney owns tens of thousands of television and film
properties,245 and also operates several platforms via which they are
distributed.246 Subscribers to Hulu (both ad-free and with ads) may
download the Hulu app to as many devices as they like, but may only
stream simultaneously on any two devices.247 Hulu competes directly
with, among other parties, streaming service Netflix. In an effort to
241 A title formerly held by The Sopranos. See Deborah Dsouza, The Success of Game
of Thrones in 5 Charts, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/
the-success-of-hbo-s-game-of-thrones-in-charts-4684966 [https://perma.cc/M3DMQZMZ].
242 See, e.g., Holly Brockwell, Game of Thrones Takes Most-Torrented TV for 7th Year
Running, GIZMODO (Jan. 2, 2020, 2:30 AM), https://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2020/01/gameof-thrones-most-torrented-tv/ [https://perma.cc/GV87-2M26].
243 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a.
244 See Mike Snider, Disney Takes over Hulu. What’s It Mean for Cord Cutters, Binge
Watchers? Change Is Coming, USA TODAY (May 14, 2019, 3:08 PM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/05/14/disney-bought-hulu-whatsmean-cord-cutters-binge-watchers/3665629002/ [https://perma.cc/6TNF-4689].
245 See Emily Todd VanDerWerff, Here’s What Disney Owns After the Massive
Disney/Fox Merger, VOX (Mar. 20, 2019, 1:10 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/culture/
2019/3/20/18273477/disney-fox-merger-deal-details-marvel-x-men [https://perma.cc/
P3JW-W3NM].
246 See, e.g., Homepage, DISNEY+, https://www.disneyplus.com (last visited Jan. 11,
2020) [https://perma.cc/L6XF-H9X4] (advertising Disney’s other platforms).
247 How Many Screens Can I Watch Hulu on at the Same Time?, HULU (May 27, 2020),
https://help.hulu.com/s/article/streams?language=en_US [https://perma.cc/KQE2-964P].
An “unlimited screens” option was recently added for an additional $9.99/month. See id.
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attract customers away from Netflix and toward the Hulu platform,
Hulu might decide to ignore its own two-device rule and let subscribers
simultaneously stream on any number of devices in any number of
locations. Once they put Netflix (and other similarly situated entities)
out of business, they can go back to enforcing the limitation (because
disgruntled consumers now have nowhere to go).
The possibility of nefarious lock-in is particularly strong in the ecommerce context. In her work on platforms and antitrust, Lina Khan
writes that:
Amazon, like other e-book sellers, has used a scheme known as
[DRM], which limits the types of devices that can read certain
e-book formats. Compelling readers to purchase a Kindle
through cheap e-books locks them into future e-book purchases
from Amazon. . . . It becomes unlikely that a reader will then
purchase a Nook and switch to buying e-books through Barnes
& Noble, even if that company is slashing prices.248
It is not only consumers who might be harmed by the anticompetitive
behavior of market-dominant platforms. As author Cory Doctorow
explains:
[I]f [my publisher] sells you one of my books for the Kindle
locked with Amazon’s DRM, neither I, nor [my publisher], can
authorise you to remove that DRM. If Amazon demands a
deeper discount (something Amazon has been doing with many
publishers as their initial ebook distribution deals come up for
renegotiation) and [my publisher] wants to shift its preferred
ebook retail to a competitor . . . it will have to bank on its
readers being willing to buy their books all over again.249
The recent litigation over application programming interfaces
(“APIs”) in Google v. Oracle offers another example.250 In that case,
Oracle and software developer Sun Microsystems were both members
of the American Committee for Interoperable Systems (“ACIS”), an
organization whose basic message was that reuse, or reimplementation,

248 Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 760-61
(2017) (citations omitted).
249 Cory Doctorow, Why the Death of DRM Would Be Good News for Readers, Writers
and Publishers, GUARDIAN (May 3, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2012/may/03/death-of-drm-good-news [https://perma.cc/94ZB-NXSQ].
250 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019).
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of APIs is not infringing.251 At the time, such a policy made sense for
two relatively small companies working to scale up. Later, when thenbehemoth Oracle bought Sun Microsystems, they sued their competitor
Google for doing the very thing they’d previously advocated for.252
To the extent that a copyright is itself a “mini-monopoly,” selective
enforcement of copyright may be used as a form of predatory pricing,
effectively raising the barrier to entry. In their work on the subject,
Danny Ben-Shahar and Assaf Jacob note that where antitrust law is
sensitive to “predatory pricing or to unlawful monopolization, [an]
incumbent may eventually reach the same result by selectively failing to
enforce copyrights.”253 In other words, a rightsholder might monetize
infringement as a means of maintaining their dominant position while
skirting the antitrust laws.
One way to mitigate the potential for anticompetitive effects
stemming from a rightsholder’s one-off decision to monetize, rather
than enforce their rights against, infringement might be to require that
all similarly-situated counterparties be treated equally — both across
partners and over time. In other words, a record label either monetizes
fan vids (regardless of their quality or promotional value), or it doesn’t.
Of course, this would also obviate the tailoring and efficiency benefits
discussed in Part III.A supra.
Another approach might be to apply a theory of estoppel to
rightsholders who selectively monetize infringement. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “estoppel” as “[a] bar that prevents one from
asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done
before . . . [.]”254 Applying this to the video game developer who tells
prospective customers to pirate a game rather than purchasing a game
key from a reseller, the rightsholder would be estopped from later
pursuing infringement claims against a user who does so. Similarly, a
record label who uses Content ID to claim advertising around 99% of
user-uploaded videos containing its copyrighted music (we can assume
a healthy mix of both fair use and infringing use) would be estopped
from selectively terminating its “authorization” at will. Worded
251 V. SRIDHAR, EMERGING ICT POLICIES AND REGULATIONS: ROADMAP TO DIGITAL
ECONOMIES 95 (Springer 2019) (“American Committee for Interoperable Systems
(ACIS) historically supported the freedom to re-implement software interfaces.”).
252 See, e.g., Brief of Copyright Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner
at 16-17, Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (No. 18-956) (noting that Oracle was a member
of ACIS when ACIS argued that reusing API is not infringing).
253 Danny Ben-Shahar & Assaf Jacob, A Preach for a Breach: Promoting Copyright
Infringements as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior 3 (Aug. 2000) (Working Paper) (on
file with author) (citations omitted).
254 Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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differently, a user whose fan vids have always been simply claimed by a
rightsholder under Content ID can be said to have a reliance claim that
such uploads will not be taken down (or litigated against, as the case
may be). This would retain the prospective benefits of monetized
infringement, while giving potentially confused consumers more
certainty.
The recent litigation over use of copyrighted photos to create political
memes is a good example of the estoppel argument in practice. In early
2020, Representative Steve King used a copyrighted photo of Laney
Marie Griner’s in a meme for use as part of King’s re-election campaign,
something Griner has referred to as “vile” and “disgusting.”255 The
challenge for her case against King doesn’t stem from the legion of
legitimate licensees — including Coca-Cola, General Mills, Microsoft,
and Marriot — but rather from the unlicensed uses of the image in
legions of unauthorized memes.
2.

Distributional Impact

On the one hand, the monetization of infringement can be viewed as
a decision borne of privilege. For example, we might say that Khalid —
whose latest album enjoyed 202,000 album-equivalent sales in its first
week of release256 — can afford to monetize the work of creative fans
like WayV, who only serve to add to his vast popularity, and to motivate
his fan base. We might not say the same of a fledgling artist who finds
herself losing precious advertising revenue to an unauthorized upload
of her official video. Similarly, HBO’s Game of Thrones — a television
series that has earned $2.28 billion over eight seasons257 — might be
well-positioned to enjoy its unconventional distinction as “most pirated
series.” The same would probably not be said of an indie film whose
filmmaker finds herself unable to compete with the pirated copies
flooding torrent sites. In this way, the monetization of infringement can

255 Ashley Cullins, Mom of “Success Kid” Threatens to Sue Rep. Steve King for Using
the Meme in Fundraising Effort, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 27, 2020, 2:53 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/rep-steve-king-threatened-lawsuit-usesuccess-kid-meme-1273866 [https://perma.cc/65GL-LGX5].
256 Keith Caulfield, Khalid’s ‘Free Spirit’ Debuts at No. 1 on Billboard 200 Albums Chart,
BILLBOARD (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/
8507048/khalid-free-spirit-debuts-at-no-1-on-billboard-200-albums-chart [https://perma.
cc/3FCT-NKNG].
257 Entertainment Strategy Guy, How ‘Game of Thrones’ Generated $2.2 Billion Worth
of Profit for HBO, DECIDER (May 21, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://decider.com/2019/
05/21/game-of-thrones-hbo-profits/ [https://perma.cc/MY95-MG72].
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be seen as yet another opportunity available only to those content
owners who are already in a privileged position.
In addition, to the extent powerful content owners set consumer
expectations, their enforcement decisions can bind unwilling
competitors. For example, gamers may come to understand that piracy
of video games is fine so long as they purchase DLC:

An indie developer with a game that doesn’t feature DLC could then
find itself losing sales with no potential upside. The former could be
said to be forbearing by choice; the latter, by default. After all, bringing
a lawsuit for copyright infringement is costly and time-consuming
under the best of circumstances; under a flood of infringement
monetized by larger developers, it may well prove untenable. Under this
view, monetizing infringement worsens extant distributional justice
concerns.
Unlike other private ordering alternatives such as Creative Commons
(“CC”), the phenomenon of monetizing infringement is not an acrossthe-board license or permission. A work licensed under CC’s
Attribution-NonCommercial (“CC BY-NC”) license, for example,
allows others to “remix, adapt, and build upon your work noncommercially, and although their new works must also acknowledge
you and be non-commercial, they don’t have to license their derivative
works on the same terms.”258 The terms “their” and “they” in this
definition refer to all-comers. This is explicitly not the case in monetized
infringement, where a rightsholder’s enforcement decision can vary
from user to user, from use to use, and from work to work.
On the other hand, the monetization of infringement might be viewed
as an equalizer of sorts. The small-budget film, unable to afford much
in the way of marketing, might encourage torrenting as a means of
258

About the Licenses, supra note 15.
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boosting box office numbers. Likewise, a little-known niche television
series might attract the attention of a behemoth like Netflix by
encouraging piracy of its episodes as a means of proving viewership. On
balance, then, the distributional effects of monetizing infringement
might go either way, and should be kept in mind when amending
legislation that might make the practice more or less accessible.
3.

Norm-Setting

Consumer confusion and conflicting social norms merit further
discussion. When a user uploads one fan vid and gets retweeted by the
artist, then uploads another fan vid and gets a strongly worded warning
and takedown from YouTube, it sends a mixed message: is this allowed,
or isn’t it? Social norms play a large role in whether or not people act in
accordance with various laws and regulations:
To the extent that laws align with, establish, or enhance the
operation of norms[,] compliance with laws is not solely a
function of formal enforcement . . . And, of course, laws do
frequently align with preexisting social norms. Though “special
interests” certainly play a role in the formulation of social
policy, it remains the case that laws “formulated in ways that
are congruent with social norms are much more likely to be
enacted than laws that offend such norms.259
Mixed signaling from rightsholders can lead to mixed social norms,
which in turn may reduce the application and effectiveness of the
relevant rule — in this case, the rule against infringement.
There is also the risk of cross-genre and cross-context confusion. An
example of the former is an avid gamer, accustomed to the norm that
games can be pirated so long as you make in-game purchases, who
might reasonably assume that they can pirate a film (perhaps in order
to peek and see if it’s worth seeing in theaters, or perhaps just to avoid
paying altogether). An example of the latter is a Hulu subscriber who
currently shares a login with eight of their roommates, and is surprised
to find that Hulu’s sister service, Disney+, locks after two devices.
Because consumers are highly unlikely to know what is in a company’s
terms of service,260 Disney+ may even end up expending customer
259 David E. DePianto, Sticky Compliance: An Endowment Account of Expressive Law,
2014 UTAH L. REV. 327, 338 (citing Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization,
Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 157, 159 (2000)).
260 See, e.g., Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service
Agreements, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
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service time (and money) responding to indignant (albeit misinformed)
consumers.
In his work on “shallow signals,” Bert Huang uses copyright as an
example of a “private permission” that might mislead as to the legality
of UGC:
You see one of today’s hit songs being played in dozens of
homemade videos posted on YouTube. Feeling confident that
there is little risk of copyright enforcement, you decide to use a
different hit song in your own video. What you don’t realize,
however, is that the first hit song happened to be covered by a
blanket license arranged by YouTube itself with that specific
radio label.261
Incomplete information and a lack of sophistication on the part of the
emulator can lead to unintended illegality. Of course, in the case of
copyright infringement — a strict liability offense — the actor’s lack of
intent is of no consequence.
One possible solution has been suggested by Michael Carroll in the
context of fair use. He proposes a “Fair Use Board” in the Copyright
Office that would rule on fair use petitions, effectively issuing “noaction” letters (with a favorable ruling) that would immunize the user
from prosecution for copyright infringement.262 Tim Wu has similarly
proposed a “Copyright No Action” policy:
Here the idea is that owners of copyrighted works, to the degree
that they accept and want to encourage limited usage of their
works, can declare so to the world, allowing them to focus on
only the most economically significant infringements while
increasing the certainty of those who might want to use the
works. They can do so using a “no action policy,” which would
describe those uses of the works that the owner will not
enforce.263
This would not obviate all of the concerns stemming from selective
enforcement and monetization, but it might mitigate user confusion (to
the extent users were aware of, and had read the contents of, such
declarations).
com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11
[https://perma.cc/2PLY-E92E] (citing a Deloitte survey finding 91% of adults accept
terms of service without reading them).
261 Bert Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2241 (2013).
262 Carroll, supra note 191, at 1090-91.
263 Wu, supra note 24, at 24-25.
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In their work on user privileges in copyright, Gideon Parchomovsky
and Phil Weiser present an alternate, two-stage mechanism:
In the first stage, Congress would require all owners and
distributors of digital content to endorse a set of user privileges
without decreeing the specific content of those privileges. In
addition, Congress would require content owners to state
clearly what user privileges their terms of use would afford and
would empower the FTC to oversee compliance. If, and only if,
these measures fail to yield a desirable level of accommodation,
Congress would move to the second stage and increase the
regulatory burden on content owners by specifying, based on
the measures adopted in stage one, the precise content of the
privileges that content owners must adopt.264
This approach — if extended beyond the fair use context — may best
serve the goal of (i) taking advantage of many of the benefits stemming
from private ordering, such as tailoring and information-forcing; while
(ii) mitigating some of the concerns resulting from monetizing
infringement, such as inaccurate norm-setting and anticompetitive
enforcement.
4.

Transparency & Accountability

One indisputable drawback of an enforcement decision made by a
private party is a lack of transparency. We can speculate as to the
impetuses that have led record labels to embrace some fan vids and shun
others, for example, but we don’t have any confirmed takeaways or
hard-and-fast “rules” as to how to make a fan vid that will evade an
infringement charge and instead be embraced as a monetization
opportunity. This uncertainty can lead to “inefficiency and
gamesmanship.”265
Another potential downside to the private monetization of copyright
infringement is that it may override congressional intent.266 In

264 Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
91, 126 (2010).
265 See García, Penalty Default, supra note 17, at 1169-71.
266 Alternately, one might argue that Congress has given rightsholders the right to
enforce their rights, or not, as they see fit. See, e.g., Jake Linford, A Second Look at the
Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 620 n.190 (2010) (“One can
interpret an owner’s willingness to transact as an indication that the market price is less
than the owner’s subjective value in retaining control and avoiding the risk presented
by transacting with another party.”).
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establishing exclusive rights for copyright holders in Section 106,267 and
in giving them remedies for infringement, the legislature determined
infringement to be undesirable, inefficient, and counterproductive for
copyright’s goal of incentivizing creation. The private monetization of
infringement arguably contradicts the congressional prescription,268
and thereby arguably diminishes the strength of copyright’s protection
for all rightsholders. The fact that most rightsholders monetize
infringing (and potentially infringing) user-generated videos to upload
to YouTube sets a norm — right or wrong — that posting a video using
someone else’s content is fine, so long as you relinquish your right to
any advertising revenues. This norm is imposed on all rightsholders,
including those who disagree — they can opt to takedown, but these
isolated takedowns are largely ineffective, and cannot hope to stem the
tide of uploads.269
Considered en masse, the monetization of infringement can amount
to unilateral policymaking. Take for instance the example of several
large video game developers monetizing piracy of their games by selling
DLC to the pirates. The position of the companies controlling a majority
market share readily becomes the position of the market. Game
developers whose products do not make money on DLC have little to
no power to “undo” the policy set by the other developers.
Finally, a regime — like copyright infringement — that leaves
enforcement to private parties allows Congress to pass laws that on their
face appease powerful lobbyists, despite the fact that in practice, private
forbearance renders them far less impactful. As Barron and Rakoff note
in their work on big waiver, this can allow politicians to shirk — to look
like they’re doing something when they’re really not, and/or to pass off
their lawmaking responsibilities to private citizens whose preferences
may not be representative of all affected parties.270

267

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
I say “arguably” because as noted we might view Congress’s grant of enforcement
authority to rightsholders as a nod of approval for private ordering of this sort.
269 See, e.g., Kevin Madigan, Despite What You Hear, Notice and Takedown Is Failing
Creators and Copyright Owners, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://cpip.gmu.edu/2016/08/24/despite-what-you-hear-notice-and-takedown-is-failingcreators-and-copyright-owners/ [https://perma.cc/2CLX-4YXL] (noting, with regard to
Taylor Swift’s album 1989, that the record label “sent over 66,000 DMCA takedown
notices. Despite their considerable efforts, over 500,000 links to the album were
identified, and ‘1989’ was illegally downloaded nearly 1.4 million times from torrent
sites”).
270 See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 163, at 307.
268
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The literature has focused primarily on copyright’s tendency to
outsource enforcement to platforms via secondary liability.271 An
equally concerning proposition raised by the monetization of
infringement is the outsourcing of enforcement to rightsholders. The
potential problem with the replacement of the state with an individual
rightsholder is that the private party’s interests may not reflect
Congress’s. Specifically, “private suits tend to act as a substitute for
public enforcement rather than a complement. . . . To the extent that
private suits take the place of public enforcement in certain sectors or
geographic areas, the ability for private objectives to supplant public
objectives is magnified.”272
Moreover, delegation of enforcement to algorithms — as in the case,
for example, of Content ID —
[L]acks sufficient measures to ensure that online intermediaries
are held accountable for their actions, failures, and
wrongdoings. . . . Algorithmic enforcement mechanisms are
nontransparent in the way they exercise discretion over
determining copyright infringement and fair use; they afford
insufficient opportunities to challenge the decisions they make
while failing to adequately secure due process; and they curtail
the possibility of correcting errors in individual determinations
of copyright infringement by impeding the opportunity for
public oversight.273
In his work on “DMCA-plus” agreements such as Content ID,
Matthew Sag emphasizes that:
[T]he defining feature of DMCA-plus arrangements is not that
those choices are good or bad, but rather that they are choices
made by rightsholders and platforms--not users, or Congress,
or even courts. Not only are these choices private, they are often
obscure, such that it is difficult to determine from the outside
even what choices have been made.274

271 See, e.g., John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion
of Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1824
(2013) (claiming that “uncertainty ‘outsources’ enforcement costs to Internet
platforms”).
272 Sarah L. Stafford, Private Policing of Environmental Performance: Does It Further
Public Goals?, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 79-80 (2012).
273 Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 478 (2016).
274 See Sag, supra note 93, at 559.
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The monetized infringement described herein differs significantly
from, for example, a Creative Commons license in that the latter is
explicit, and preannounced, with prescribed terms and limits. The
monetized infringement described herein may be explicit or implicit. It
may be “announced” — like the game developers’ plea to prospective
key purchasers — or it may be on a case-by-case basis—like in the case
of fan videos. To the extent Congress delegates enforcement authority
to rightsholders, it might consider measures to mitigate the potential
for public-private interest misalignment, perhaps by reading implicit
terms into such monetization thereby constraining their ability to
revoke and/or limit use after the fact. Another option might be to read
an implied license into the monetization of infringement, protecting at
least parties whose use was previously monetized from being claimed
against in the future for the same use. The next subpart details the
government’s role further.
C. Role of Government
Parties will circumvent a statute and engage in private ordering when
they can (or when they believe they can) do better — make more
money, save more money, avoid a transaction cost like negative PR, etc.
This requires an unpalatable statute, also known as a penalty default.275
Where a statute is a misfit — as the copyright statute is for many works
and uses276 — private rightsholders can (and do) engage in various
forms of DIY tailoring, including monetizing infringement. The
government’s role in monetizing infringement, then, is to set a baseline
against which the private parties’ gains can be measured. In setting a
one-size-fits-all statute that is slow to respond to technological change
and subject to legislative capture, the legislature has established in
copyright an ideal penalty default statute.
To the extent this allows those for whom the statute works to operate
under it, and those who can do better via private ordering to do so, the
government might do best to simply set the default and then stay out of
the way (assuming no market harm caused by the default).277 Indeed,

275

See García, Penalty Default, supra note 17.
See supra Part III.A.2.
277 In their seminal article on behavioral economics and the law, Cass Sunstein and
Richard Thaler urge caution when setting governmental defaults, as they tend to be
“sticky.” Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV 1159, 1201 (2003) (“[I]n many domains, people’s
preferences are labile and ill-formed, and hence starting points and default rules are
likely to be quite sticky. In these circumstances, the goal should be to avoid random,
276
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copyright’s compulsory licenses may be viewed as the inevitable result
of monetized infringement: rightsholders who have accepted the fact
that infringement benefits them and now seek governmentally enforced
payment.
Notably, copyright does not have a designated agency with the
authority to adapt or tailor the statute.278 At best, the Copyright Office
supports the legislature through the preparation of non-binding studies
and reports, and through the maintenance of an informational
compendium.279 Perhaps this suggests that Congress recognized its
limitations in this area, and so it intentionally set a penalty default that
would encourage private ordering — in this case, the monetization of
infringement.
The government’s role as backstop is very important for monetized
infringement. It allows rightsholders — such as Aphex Twin and Warp
Records — to look like good guys when they embrace and promote a
fan vid, while retaining the right to revert to the statute in instances of
undesired infringement. It allows the signatories to Content ID to earn
advertising revenues from YouTube, unless and until they decide to
move on to another business model, at which point they can again turn
to the statute for protection. Indeed, the very development of
arrangements like Content ID were prompted by the threat of litigation
stemming from the statute as backdrop: For example, Content ID was
developed “while copyright litigation was pending against [YouTube]
in federal court. Google launched Content ID shortly after acquiring

inadvertent, arbitrary, or harmful effects and to produce a situation that is likely to
promote people’s welfare . . . .”).
278 Perhaps it should. See Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1553-55 (2016) (discussing an enhanced role for a copyright
agency). But see Jake Linford, Improving Technology Neutrality Through Compulsory
Licensing, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 126, 142 (2016) (“For better or worse,
Congress designated itself the institution responsible for making wholesale revisions to
the Act . . . agencies are already empowered to shape copyright law by managing
compulsory damage regimes and crafting exceptions to liability for circumventing
technological protection measures or trafficking in technology that circumvents those
measures.”).
279 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES § 101 (3d ed. 2017) (stating its purpose is to instruct agency staff and provide
information); Policy Reports, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/
policy/policy-reports.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V8CV-3QV2]
(providing a collection of policy reports).
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YouTube and getting sued by Viacom and other copyright industry
plaintiffs for billions of dollars in statutory damages.”280
CONCLUSION
The notion that copyright infringement is something to be mitigated
relies upon an assumption that it necessarily harms rightsholders. The
conventional account is that infringement always diminishes artists’
ability to earn a living, thereby reducing their incentive to create. In
order to preserve creative output — and with it, a culturally robust
society — copyright law must therefore stop infringement where it can,
and punish it (often severely) where it cannot.
This Essay has presented a series of case studies demonstrating just
the opposite to be true. Infringement does not always harm
rightsholders. Instead, they may benefit via new, more efficient business
models, increased revenues, and lower costs. In these cases, monetizing
infringement may lead to an improvement in overall efficiency.
By describing the paradox of rightsholders who actively monetize
infringement of their copyrighted work, I aim to suggest that we have a
long way to go toward a positive theory of copyright. As we move in
that direction, I hope to offer several major takeaways for both scholars
and legislators. Importantly, monetized infringement demonstrates that
rightsholders are a heterogeneous group with endogenous preferences.
It is not only the case that one statutory license doesn’t fit all content,
but also that one perspective of infringement as “bad” doesn’t fit all
content owners.
A nuanced and critical examination of infringement enforcement in
practice should lead us to reconsider the axiomatic assumption that
rightsholders are necessarily anti-infringement. Perhaps legislators have
been misled by lobbyists’ doomsday scenarios that describe
infringement and piracy as the ultimate threat to the creative industries.
By effectively allowing for DIY tailoring, perhaps the option for
rightsholders to privately forbear is keeping the current (otherwise,
one-size-fits-none) regime workable. Congress might be well-served to
consider the information that monetized infringement provides when
amending and updating the current statute. At the very least,
recognizing that infringement can be “good” should guide us toward a
regime that takes into account diverse perspectives and outcomes.

280 Annemarie Bridy, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: DMCA-Plus Enforcement by Internet
Intermediaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 14 (John A.
Rothchild ed., 2016).
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Finally, a theory of monetized infringement is a theory of private
policymaking. Like governmental and administrative forbearance,
private ordering via nonenforcement relies on a delegation of
enforcement authority. Unlike governmental and administrative
forbearance, private ordering via nonenforcement runs the risk of
placing a potentially disproportionate share of power in the hands of
already dominant players, while further disenfranchising less
established artists, intermediaries with fewer resources, and
traditionally marginalized communities. This possibility should be
taken seriously by scholars and lawmakers concerned about copyright’s
role as a driver of inequality.

